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FREEDOM OF INHERITANCE
Mark Glover*
Abstract
The law grants individuals the broad freedom of disposition to decide
how their property should be distributed upon death. The rationale
underlying freedom of disposition is that the choices of individual donors
produce results that maximize social welfare. Policymakers are rightfully
skeptical that they can craft a mandatory estate plan that fits all situations
or that probate courts can consistently and accurately assess the merits of
particular dispositions of property. By contrast, the donor is in the best
position to evaluate her own specific circumstances and to place property
in the hands of the donees who will benefit the most.
The donor, however, is not the sole decision-maker regarding the
disposition of her property after death. To be sure, she enjoys broad
freedom to craft an estate plan to her liking. But when the donor decides
to make a gift to a particular donee, the donee must also make a decision.
Specifically, she must decide either to accept the gift from the donor or to
reject it. Whereas the donor’s discretion to decide which testamentary gifts
to make is referred to as freedom of disposition, the donee’s discretion to
decide which testamentary gifts to accept or to reject can be labeled
“freedom of inheritance.”
Although legal scholars have paid much attention to the donor’s
freedom of disposition and have explained that it plays an important role
in maximizing social welfare, relatively little attention has been paid to
the donee’s freedom of inheritance and the role it plays in maximizing the
utility generated from the donor’s estate. To fill this analytical void, this
Article defines the donee’s freedom of inheritance and identifies how it
works in concert with the donor’s freedom of disposition to maximize
social welfare. Ultimately, this Article argues that the donee’s freedom of
inheritance is an important part of the process of transferring wealth after
death and that policymakers should strive to facilitate the donee’s exercise
of this freedom when crafting the law of succession.

*
© 2017 Mark Glover. Associate Professor of Law, UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING
COLLEGE OF LAW; L.L.M., HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 2011; J.D., magna cum laude, BOSTON
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 2008. Thanks to the University of Wyoming College of Law
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INTRODUCTION
Freedom of disposition is the cornerstone of the modern law of succession.1
Individuals enjoy nearly unfettered discretion to decide how property should be
distributed upon death,2 and the law is largely designed to facilitate the exercise of
this freedom.3 Because of freedom of disposition’s central role within the law of
succession, it is easy to view the decision-making process regarding inheritance as
one-sided—the donor decides what property the donee should receive upon her
death, and the donee gladly accepts the gift when that time comes. Although this
view of inheritance is perhaps intuitive, the donee is not a passive participant in the
disposition of the donor’s property. To the contrary, when the donor decides to name
a donee as a beneficiary of her estate, the donee must make a decision of her own.
After the donor’s death, she must decide whether to accept the gift from the donor
or to reject it.4 Whereas the donor’s discretion to decide which testamentary gifts to
make is referred to as “freedom of disposition,” the donee’s discretion to decide
which testamentary gifts to accept or to reject can be labeled “freedom of
inheritance.”5
Although freedom of disposition’s primary role within the law of succession is
unmistakable, the role of freedom of inheritance is not clearly defined or well
1

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt.
a, (AM. LAW INST. 2003); Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante
Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1133–34 (2013); Robert H.
Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643,
643 (2014); see also infra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
2
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt.
a, (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Property owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dispose of
their property as they please.”); Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping
Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 882–85 (2012) (“Americans enjoy
nearly unbridled testamentary freedom, a right that has been fully engrained in the American
psyche.”).
3
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt.
c, (AM. LAW INST. 2003); JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 1 (9th ed. 2013).
4
See infra Part II.
5
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1133 n.37 (“Testamentary freedom, i.e., a donor’s right to
select beneficiaries is technically distinct from the freedom of inheritance, i.e., the donee’s
right to receive property . . . .”). The term “freedom of inheritance” is rarely used within legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Robert J. Lynn, Legal and Economic Implications of the Emergence
of Quasi-Public Wealth, 65 YALE L.J. 786, 787 n.4 (1956) (quoting Josiah Stamp,
Inheritance: Economic Aspects, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 357 (1937)). In addition
to the meaning ascribed to it in this Article, freedom of inheritance is sometimes used to
describe “the freedom of an owner at death to avoid confiscation of her property by the state.”
Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J.
1, 6 n.16 (1992); see Eike G. Hosemann, Protecting Freedom of Testation: A Proposal for
Law Reform, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 419, 421 n.5 (2014); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1133
n.37.
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understood. Because freedom of disposition has received substantial scholarly
attention, significant issues, such as why the donor has broad liberty to distribute
property at death and how the law should facilitate the exercise of this freedom, have
been deeply explored.6 By contrast, because freedom of inheritance has resided in
obscurity, similarly important questions regarding the donee’s discretion to accept
or to reject testamentary gifts have gone unanswered. To fill this analytical void, this
Article defines the donee’s freedom of inheritance and identifies the rationales that
justify this freedom’s place within the law of succession. Ultimately, this Article
argues that the donee’s freedom of inheritance is an important part of the process of
transferring wealth after death and that policymakers should strive to facilitate the
donee’s exercise of this freedom when crafting the law of succession.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes freedom of disposition’s
fundamental status within the law of succession, including the rationales underlying
this freedom. Part II then shifts the Article’s focus to the related, yet overlooked
freedom of inheritance. Specifically, Part II differentiates the donee’s freedom of
inheritance from the donor’s freedom of disposition and explains why the law grants
the donee the discretion to accept or to reject transfers from the donor’s estate. Part
III concludes the Article by exploring how the law should facilitate the donee’s
exercise of freedom of inheritance.
I. FREEDOM OF DISPOSITION
The modern law of succession is founded upon the donor’s freedom of
disposition.7 As The Restatement (Third) of Property (the “Restatement”) explains,
“The organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is freedom of
disposition,” and as such, “[p]roperty owners have the nearly unrestricted right to

6

See infra Part I.
See In re Estate of Malloy, 949 P.2d 804, 806 (Wash. 1998) (“A basic principle
underlying any discussion of the law of wills is that an individual has the right and the
freedom to dispose of his or her property, upon death, according to the dictates of his or her
own desires.”); THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 349 (5th ed. 2011) (“Freedom of disposition is a
hallmark of the American law of succession.”); Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential
Framework of Estate Planning, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 444–45 (2012) (“Testamentary
freedom is so fundamental that it has consistently been heralded as the keystone of the law
of succession.”); Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
587, 632 (1989) (“[C]ourts traditionally exalt freedom of testation and the fulfillment of
testamentary intent as central to gratuitous transfers policy.”); Paula A. Monopoli, Toward
Equality: Nonmarital Children and the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
995, 1010 n.94 (“Freedom of testation and testator’s intent are frequently identified as
paramount jurisprudential touchstones in the area of trusts and estates.”); E. Gary Spitko,
Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural
Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 278 (1999)
(“The ideal of testamentary freedom grounds the law of testation.”).
7
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dispose of their property as they please.”8 Whereas the Restatement describes the
ability of owners to dispose of property both during life and at death, Professor
Robert Sitkoff specifically describes freedom of disposition’s place within the law
of succession:
The American law of succession embraces freedom of disposition,
authorizing dead hand control, to an extent that is unique among modern
legal systems . . . . The right of a property owner to dispose of his or her
property on terms that he or she chooses has come to be recognized as a
separate stick in the bundle of rights called property.9
Because of the primacy of dead-hand control, an analysis of the donee’s freedom of
inheritance must build upon an understanding of the donor’s freedom of disposition.
This section therefore explains the mechanics of and rationales underlying this
freedom.
A. Mechanics
Traditionally, the donor exercises freedom of disposition by executing a will in
which she expresses how she wants her estate distributed.10 In particular, the donor
specifies what property goes to which donees.11 However, because a will becomes
effective only upon death, the donor retains full ownership over her property,
maintaining the right during life to do with her property as she pleases. 12

8

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM.
LAW INST. 2003).
9
Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 643–44; see Cantrell v. Cantrell, No. M2002-02883-COAR3-CV, 2004 WL 3044907 *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2004) (“A fundamental principle of
the law of wills is that a testator is entitled to dispose of the testator’s property as he or she
sees fit, regardless of any perceived injustice that may result from such a choice.”);
Weisbord, supra note 2, at 882 (“The most fundamental guiding principle of American
inheritance law is testamentary freedom—that the person who owns property during life has
the power to direct its disposition at death.”).
10
See Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the
Will: An Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 156 (2008) (explaining that
“estate planning . . . at one time involved not much more than the drafting and execution of
a will”).
11
A gift of particular property, such as a piece of real property, is called a specific
bequest, and a gift of a general benefit, such as a sum of money, is called a general bequest.
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 374.
12
See John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying
Wrongful Interference with Inheritance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 335, 342 (2013) (“The interest of
a prospective beneficiary under a will or will substitute does not ripen into a cognizable right
until the donor’s death. Until then, a prospective beneficiary has a mere ‘expectancy’ that is
subject to defeasance at the donor’s whim.”).

2017]

FREEDOM OF INHERITANCE

287

Furthermore, because a will is ambulatory, the donor can change her mind regarding
the disposition of her estate by revoking or amending her will prior to death.13
In addition to executing a will, the donor can exercise freedom of disposition
by distributing property upon death through other avenues, such as life insurance
policies, payable-on-death bank accounts, and revocable trusts.14 Scholars adopted
the term “will substitute” to describe these instruments because they are the
functional equivalents of wills. 15 Specifically, the donor can retain ownership of
property during life and designate a donee who takes ownership of the property after
the donor’s death.16 For example, when the donor deposits funds in a payable-ondeath bank account, she retains ownership of the property and can do as she pleases
with the account funds. 17 Moreover, she can designate a beneficiary, who will
become the owner of the account assets after her death. 18 Under this scenario,
ownership of the account funds transfers from the donor to the donee upon the
donor’s death without the need for a will. Thus, within the context of contemporary
estate planning, the donor’s options for exercising freedom of disposition have
expanded to include not only the traditional will but also various will substitutes that
function similarly to wills.

13

See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 215.
“A donor may exercise her freedom of disposition at death other than by will in
probate. . . . [R]evocable inter vivos trusts, life insurance and other pay-on-death contracts,
pension plans and retirement accounts, and other legal arrangements . . . have the effect of
passing property at death outside of probate. Taken together, these will substitutes constitute
a nonprobate system of private succession . . . .” Id. at 435; see Mark Glover, The Solemn
Moment: Expanding Therapeutic Jurisprudence Throughout Estate Planning, 3 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. ONLINE 19, 19–20 (2015); see generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate
Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108–09 (1984)
(describing the “demand for probate avoidance” and the rise of “free-market competitors of
the pro bate system”); Melanie B. Leslie & Steward E. Sterk, Revisiting the Revolution:
Reintegrating the Wealth Transmission System, 56 B.C. L. REV. 61, 61–64, (2015)
(describing the growth of a “system of non-probate transfers.”).
15
See Grayson M.P. McCouch, Probate Law Reform and Nonprobate Transfers, 62 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 757, 758–59 (2008) (“Will substitutes, as the name implies, are designed to
achieve the practical effect of a will—designating beneficiaries to receive property at the
donor’s death . . . .”).
16
See id.
17
See Jordan v. Burgbacher, 883 P.2d 458, 463 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (“A POD account
belongs to the original depositor during that person’s lifetime and not to the POD payee or
payees.”).
18
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
7.1 cmt. g (AM LAW INST. 2003) (“There are several types of payable-on-death
arrangements. One is a POD bank account that is carried in the name of the depositor (the
donor) and is ‘payable on the death of the depositor to’ the designated beneficiary.”).
14
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B. Rationales
The underlying rationale of freedom of disposition has long been a topic of
debate. Of the various justifications of freedom of disposition that have been
proposed, perhaps the oldest, is that the donor has a natural right to distribute
property at death. 19 Professors Adam Hirsch and William Wang explain this
rationale as: “Having created wealth by the sweat of her brow, the testator is
naturally free to do with it as she pleases—including passing it along to others.”20
Although this natural rights rationale of freedom of disposition has deep roots,21 it
also has long been questioned and has largely lost favor.22
A second general explanation of freedom of disposition’s place within the
modern law of succession is that most people expect and prefer to have broad liberty
to dispose of property upon death.23 Professor Lewis Simes proposed this idea by
suggesting that “the desire to dispose of property by will is very general, and very
strong” and, as such, “[a] compelling argument in favor of it is that it accords with
human wishes.” 24 The recognition of the strong political preference for broad
freedom of disposition leads to the realization that freedom of disposition is difficult
to restrain.25 Even if the law attempted to severally limit the ability to dispose of
property upon death, for example by eliminating disposition of property by will,
people would find ways around these limitations, such as by transferring property
during life or by other means designed to transfer property at death.26 Similar to the
natural rights theory, 27 this pragmatic take on freedom of disposition does not
adequately explain freedom of disposition’s central role in the modern law of
succession.28

19

See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 6–7. “Such a natural right was posited by
Roman jurists.” Id. at 6 n.17.
20
Id. at 6.
21
See id. at 6–7 (explaining that seventeenth century commentators John Locke and
Hugo Grotius supported the natural rights theory of freedom of disposition); see also Kelly,
supra note 1, at 1135 n.48 (same).
22
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 6–7 (suggesting that “from at least the
seventeenth century, ideologists have disputed the natural rights theory of testation” but that
“after centuries in eclipse” the natural rights theory of freedom of disposition “has lately
drawn flickers of judicial support”); see also Ronald Chester, Essay: Is the Right to Devise
Property Constitutionally Protected? – The Strange Case of Hodel v. Irving, 24 SW. U. L.
REV. 1195, 1195–96 (1995) (casting doubt on the validity of dead-hand control over
property).
23
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 14 (“[T]he power to bequeath comports with
political preferences . . . .”).
24
LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 21 (1955).
25
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 11–12 (“A secondary justification for the right
of testation is that it would in practice be difficult to curtail.”).
26
See id.
27
See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.
28
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 11–12.
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Whatever the merits of justifying freedom of disposition as either a natural right
or a political preference, much of the discussion surrounding the underlying
rationale of freedom of disposition now focuses on what Professor Daniel Kelly
describes as “functional considerations.”29 He explains, “This functional perspective
emphasizes the ‘social welfare’ of the parties and seeks to determine how the law
can create the best incentives for the donor, donees, and other parties that a donor’s
disposition of property may effect.”30 When viewed from this functional perspective
that focuses on maximizing the wellbeing of society as a whole, broad freedom of
disposition could be based upon several rationales,31 including that it increases the
donor’s utility, increases the donee’s utility, and provides incentives that increase
social welfare.
1. Donor Utility
First, broad freedom of disposition increases the satisfaction of the donor.32
Indeed, the ability to pass property upon death, particularly to close family members,
can improve the welfare of individual members of society.33 As Professor Edward
Halbach suggests,
[A] society should be concerned with the total amount of happiness it can
offer, and to many of its members it is a great comfort and satisfaction to
know during life that, even after death, those whom one cares about can
be provided for and may be able to enjoy better lives because of the
inheritance that can be left to them.34

29

Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135.
Id.; see Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the
Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 432 (2001) (“The most prevalent justification for
testamentary freedom is the utilitarian view which posits that testamentary freedom is not a
right but rather a privilege offered for the purpose of motivating socially desirable
behavior.”).
31
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135–38; see also Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 6–13
(listing the “varied” and “controversial . . . rationales for testamentary freedom”).
32
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135–36.
33
See Glover, Therapeutic Jurisprudential, supra note 7, at 443–46; see also Hirsch &
Wang, supra note 5, at 8 n.26 (“The nature of that satisfaction – whether (or to what extent)
it is genetically programmed (‘nepotism’) rather than derived from social interaction
(‘altruism’), and whether it can involve altruistic impulses other than those signaling
interdependent utilities with the beneficiaries – remains unclear.”).
34
Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1-4, in DEATH, TAXES AND
FAMILY PROPERTY 3, 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977); see Hirsch & Wang, supra note
5, at 8 (explaining that “modern social scientists” assume that “persons derive satisfaction
out of bequeathing property to others”).
30
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If freedom of disposition were substantially curtailed, a source of individual
satisfaction would be eliminated, and overall societal happiness would decrease.35
Freedom of disposition could therefore be explained as promoting social welfare by
providing a source of happiness and satisfaction to individual donors.
2. Donee Utility
Second, the donor’s ability to direct the disposition of property upon death
allows for intelligent estate planning.36 Donors likely have a better understanding of
how to distribute their wealth upon death in a way that maximizes the utility of
donees rather than the policymakers who would direct the disposition of estates in
the absence of freedom of disposition. 37 As Kelly explains, “compared to
legislatures or courts, donors may possess better information about the
circumstances of family members and other donees,” and “[t]his informational
advantage may allow donors to select the highest-valued donee (e.g., a gifted or
disabled child).” 38 If freedom of disposition were eliminated, the superior
knowledge of donors would be ignored and property would likely be distributed in
a less optimal way. 39 As such, freedom of disposition could be based upon the
rationale that it allows those with the best knowledge of familial need to direct
wealth to its most beneficial use.

35

See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 65 (2004)
(“In an important sense, bequeathing property is simply one way of using property. And
therefore society should not interfere with bequests for the same general reason that it is
undesirable for society to constrain the use of property. Namely, this tends to reduce
individuals’ utility directly (a person will derive less utility from property if he wants to
bequeath it but is prevented from doing so) . . . .”); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 8 (“To
the extent that lawmakers deny persons the opportunity to bequeath freely, the subjective
value of property will drop, for one of its potential uses will have disappeared.”); Gordon
Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14 J.L. & ECON. 465, 474 (1971) (“Individuals before death
would be injured if they are prohibited from passing on their estate to their heirs because it
eliminates one possible alternative which they might otherwise choose.”).
36
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 12–13; Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136–37.
37
See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 44 (1995) (“Certainly, benefactors can be expected to
possess the information and insight into their families’ affairs necessary to distribute their
wealth in a rational manner.”).
38
Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136; see Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give
Me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163,
177 (1996) (“Testamentary freedom . . . allows the testator to weigh the varying needs of his
family.”); Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem,
41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 484 (2006) (“[T]he testator . . . can distribute property in
accordance [with] each family members’ needs.”).
39
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136–37.
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3. Incentives
Finally, freedom of disposition provides two important incentives that increase
social welfare. First, freedom of disposition promotes the maximization of societal
wealth.40 The knowledge that one has the ability to direct the disposition of property
at death provides individuals an incentive to be productive during life and to save
and invest, rather than to consume.41 By contrast, if freedom of disposition were
substantially restrained, this incentive for productivity and savings would disappear
because a potential use of property would be eliminated.42 Individuals might work
less and consume more during life,43 which, as Kelly suggests, “will affect not only
the donor’s utility but also society’s savings and its capital base.”44 Thus, freedom
of disposition could be justified as providing an incentive for productivity, which
has overarching societal benefits.
Second, freedom of disposition incentivizes intrafamily caregiving.45 If family
members know that donors have the ability to direct the distribution of wealth upon
death, they may be more willing to care for aging or ailing donors.46 The possibility
of disinheritance incentivizes the provision of family caregiving, which in turn
promotes overall social welfare. As Hirsch and Wang explain, freedom of
disposition “serves the public interest” by “support[ing] . . . a market for the
provision of social services” and “encourage[ing] . . . beneficiaries to provide [the
donor] with care and comfort—services that add to the total economic ‘pie.’” 47
Therefore, although family members may provide care to donors absent the
incentives created by the possibility of disinheritance, 48 freedom of disposition
might be justified as encouragement of intrafamily caregiving.

40

See id. at 1136.
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 8 (“[F]reedom of testation creates an incentive
to industry and saving.”); Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead
Hand Control, 64 TUL. L. REV. 705, 749 (1990) (“Allowing owners to give their assets and
money to others, whether at death or inter vivos, creates an incentive for productive
activities.”).
42
See SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 65 (explaining that restricting freedom of disposition
“lowers [individuals’] incentives to work (a person will not work as hard to accumulate
property if he cannot then bequeath it as he pleases)”).
43
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 8 (“[T]hwarted testators will choose to
accumulate less property, and the total stock of wealth existing at any given time will
shrink.”).
44
Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136; see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 8 (“Testamentary
freedom accordingly fulfills the normative goal of wealth maximization, which is advanced
by its proponents as the best available barometer of utility maximization.”).
45
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 9–11; Kelly, supra note 1, at 1137.
46
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1137.
47
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 9–10.
48
See id. at 11 (“[T]he strongest argument against this rationale may be the practical
observation that supplies of social services appear generally to be inelastic; they are
forthcoming, in poor families as in rich, more or less irrespective of the suppliers’ inheritance
41
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As illustrated above, freedom of disposition’s place within the law of
succession is not necessarily explained by a single rationale. In the past, freedom of
disposition may have enjoyed some support based upon the theory that the ability to
transfer property upon death is a natural right.49 In modern times, perhaps freedom
of disposition is simply explained as a political preference that would be difficult to
curtail.50 However, regardless of the merits of these two rationales, most scholars
today analyze freedom of disposition from a functional perspective that focuses on
the maximization of social welfare.51 When viewed from this perspective, freedom
of disposition could be justified as a way to increase donor utility,52 increase donee
utility,53 and incentivize productivity and intrafamily caregiving.54
II. FREEDOM OF INHERITANCE
Just as the law grants the donor the general freedom to decide how to distribute
property upon death,55 the law also grants the donee the general freedom to decide
whether to accept or to reject testamentary gifts. As Hirsch explains, “Most
beneficiaries accept inheritances with open arms; other ones prefer, for whatever
reason, to reject them. Under most circumstances today, beneficiaries are free to
accept or reject an inheritance as they see fit.”56 The donee’s discretion over the
acceptance of transfers from the donor’s estate can be labeled “freedom of
inheritance.”57 Whereas the donor’s freedom of disposition has been the subject of
much scrutiny, the donee’s freedom of inheritance has received substantially less
attention. As such, this section describes the mechanics of freedom of inheritance
and suggests potential rationales that might underlie this freedom.
prospects. Just as an assortment of motives drives persons to produce wealth, so does a
complex of motives and emotions stimulate persons to care for each other.”).
49
See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.
50
See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text.
51
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135.
52
See supra Part I.A.
53
See supra Part I.B.
54
See supra Part I.C.
55
See supra Part I.
56
Adam J. Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2014).
57
Others have described the donee’s discretion to accept or reject a transfer from the
donor’s estate as a “freedom.” See, e.g., id. (using the term “beneficiaries’ freedom”); Joan
B. Ellsworth, On Disclaimers: Let’s Renounce I.R.C. Section 2518, 38 VILL. L. REV. 693,
698 (1993) (“The intended recipient’s freedom to accept or refuse an inter-vivos or
testamentary gift has long been recognized by the courts . . . .”). However, the term “freedom
of inheritance” has generally not been used in this context and, in fact, could be used in other
contexts. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 6 n.16. Furthermore, the use of the term
“inheritance” could suggest that this freedom applies only to gifts that are transferred through
intestacy. However, for the sake of simplicity this Article uses the term “freedom of
inheritance” to refer to the discretion to accept or to reject all transfers that flow from the
donor after death, whether through intestacy, a will, a nonprobate transfer, or other type of
transfer, such as the forced spousal share and distributions to creditors.
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A. Mechanics
When the donor exercises her freedom of disposition and directs a posthumous
transfer of property to a donee, the donee has an option.58 She can accept the transfer
and take possession of the property.59 Alternatively, she can reject the gift, or, in the
parlance of inheritance law, she can “disclaim” her interest in the property. 60
Although freedom of inheritance is now expansive, the common law limited the
donee’s discretion to disclaim posthumous gifts to those flowing through a will;61 as
such, the donee could not disclaim a gift received through intestacy.62 However, all
states have now adopted disclaimer statutes that supersede the common law and that
extend the donee’s discretion to intestate transfers. 63 Furthermore, mirroring the
expansion of the donor’s freedom of disposition into will substitutes, such as
revocable trusts and life insurance,64 the donee’s freedom of inheritance also extends
to gifts flowing outside the probate system.65 Thus, under modern law, the donee
can accept or reject a posthumous gift regardless of the form of the transfer.
In addition to the donee’s general ability to disclaim posthumous gifts, whether
under a will or through intestacy, freedom of inheritance also plays a role in the
forced spousal share. 66 Although the donor generally enjoys broad freedom of
58

See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 588 (“The beneficiary of a gratuity may accept or reject
it at his discretion.”).
59
See Adam J. Hirsch, Revisions in Need of Revising: The Uniform Disclaimer of
Property Interests Act, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 110 (2001) (“In the usual course of events,
most persons are inclined to accept any bequest of property that a testator has the good grace
to leave them. However, nobler it is to give than to receive, receiving also has its charms.”).
60
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 140. “By traditional usage, an heir
renounces; a beneficiary under a will disclaims. Today, the two words are used
interchangeably as synonyms. The term disclaimer is the one more commonly used to
describe the formal refusal to take by an heir or a beneficiary.” Id. at 140 n.81.
61
See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 591.
62
See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1904 (“Intestate property was ‘cast’ upon the heir and
could not be disclaimed under the common law . . . .”). “The reason for this rule was that
there must always be someone seised of the land who was liable for the feudal obligations, a
reason of no importance today.” DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 140.
63
See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1904 (explaining that the traditional common law rule
“persisted in several American states as late as the 1990s but . . . is now superseded
everywhere by statute.”).
64
See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
65
See Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 706–07 (“Property passing by contract, rather than
by gift, bequest or intestacy, may also be disclaimed. Life insurance proceeds and survivors’
benefits under employee plans are prime examples of such interests.”); Adam J. Hirsch, The
Uniform Acts’ Loophole in Fraudulent Conveyance Law, 34 ESTATE PLANNING 20, 21
(2007) (“A ‘disclaimer’ constitutes the rejection of an inheritance offered under a
benefactor’s will or will-substitute, or by virtue of intestacy law.”).
66
Freedom of inheritance, as defined by this Article, also plays a role in the rights of
creditors to the donor’s estate. In particular, creditors are not required to seek payment from
the donor’s estate, but instead can choose not to file a claim against the donor’s estate.
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disposition,67 the surviving spouse of the donor is entitled to a share of the donor’s
estate regardless of the donor’s intent.68 Even if the donor attempts to disinherit a
surviving spouse by leaving behind a legally effective will that does not provide for
the spouse, the law allows the spouse to share in the donor’s estate.69 The surviving
spouse need not, however, take the forced share. Instead, the surviving spouse can
choose to take according to the terms of the donor’s will.70 Therefore, like a donee
can accept or disclaim a gift that the donor intends to give, a surviving spouse can
reject the transfer that the law requires the donor to offer to the surviving spouse.
This option to reject the forced spousal share is evident in an alternate name that is
sometimes used to describe this transfer: the elective share. 71 Indeed, this label
perhaps better describes the rights of the surviving spouse, who is not forced to take
the share but whom can elect to take the share if so inclined. Thus, by either
accepting or declining her forced share, the surviving spouse exercises her freedom
of inheritance.
When a donee exercises her freedom of inheritance by rejecting a transfer from
the donor’s estate, the donor does not select who should take the property in her
place. 72 Instead, the law typically holds that the disclaiming donee is treated as
having predeceased the donor, in which case the disclaimed property is distributed
to an alternate donee. 73 If the donor specifically names an alternate donee who
should take if the primary donee predeceases her, then the donor’s express intent
governs the disposition of disclaimed property.74 If the donor does not provide for
the contingency of a predeceasing donee, then the law provides rules of construction
and interpretation to determine who should benefit instead of the named donee.75
Under either scenario, a disclaiming donee does not have the power to specify who
67

See supra Part I.
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 512–16; see, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE §
2-201 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010).
69
See Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1245 (“The power to devise is not complete in the separate property
states . . . . In every separate property state, state law gives surviving spouses the right to
make claims against their deceased spouses’ estates, even if the deceased spouses explicitly
disinherited them.”).
70
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 513.
71
See id.
72
See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 608 (“The disclaimant has no power to channel the
inheritance to chosen takers in lieu of himself.”).
73
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 140.
74
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 163 (“In the absence of testamentary instructions,
disclaimed property goes to whomever would have received it had the disclaimant
predeceased the benefactor, as determined by the state’s antilapse and intestacy statutes, but
if a will does anticipate this contingency by naming a substitute beneficiary in the event that
the primary beneficiary disclaims, that stipulation controls the devolution of the property.”).
“Under UDPIA, a contingency clause specifying how a bequest will devolve in the event a
beneficiary predeceases is broadly construed to govern the devolution of a bequest a
surviving beneficiary disclaims.” Id. at 163 n.263.
75
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 351–52, 357–61.
68
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should take in her place. Indeed, freedom of inheritance extends only to the donee’s
decision to accept or to reject a transfer from the donor’s estate, and as such, the
donee has no influence over the consequences of her decision to disclaim.
B. Rationales
As explained previously, the law’s grant of broad freedom of disposition is
justified today as a way to maximize social welfare.76 More particularly, freedom of
disposition is explained as not only maximizing the utility of the donor but also
placing incentives on donors and donees that increase social welfare.77 Although
freedom of inheritance has not been firmly placed within this welfare model, it can
be seen as nicely complimenting the donor’s freedom of disposition in furthering the
law’s social welfare maximization goal. Specifically, freedom of inheritance
maximizes the donee’s welfare by providing her discretion to select the testamentary
transfers that increase her individual utility. It also either increases the donor’s utility
or does not affect her utility depending upon her reasons for giving. Finally, freedom
of inheritance alleviates moral hazard problems and issues regarding imperfect
information and transaction costs by allowing the donee to engage in postmortem
estate planning.
1. Donee Utility
The conventional rationale underlying freedom of inheritance focuses on
individual autonomy and suggests that property should not be forced upon the
donee. 78 For instance, the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act (the
“UDPIA”) explains that “the principle behind all disclaimers” (and therefore
freedom of inheritance generally) is that “no one can be forced to accept property.”79
Although respect for the personal autonomy of the donee provides a specific
rationale for freedom of inheritance, this explanation can be reframed so that the
law’s respect of the donee’s autonomy is merely one of several mechanisms that the
law employs to maximize social welfare.
As explained previously, the law’s grant of broad freedom of disposition to the
donor increases social welfare by maximizing the donor’s utility.80 Put simply, the
76

See supra Part I.B.
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135.
78
See Andrew S. Bender, Disclaimer Law: A Call for Statutory Reform, 2001 U. ILL.
L. REV. 887, 892 (“The primary rationale was that an intended recipient could not have
ownership thrust upon her. Essentially, recognition of disclaimers protected ‘[p]ersonal
autonomy.’”); Hirsch, supra note 7, at 588 (“Personal autonomy and effectuation of intent
have served as the traditional touchstones of this area of law.”).
79
UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT § 5 cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010). The UDPIA has been incorporated into the Uniform
Probate Code. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2–1101 to 2–1117 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010).
80
See supra notes 32–35 and accompany text.
77
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donor receives benefit from the ability to direct the disposition of property after
death.81 Just as the law’s respect of the personal autonomy of the donor maximizes
the donor’s utility, the law’s respect of the personal autonomy of the donee
maximizes the donee’s utility. The law’s respect for the donee’s autonomy to decide
whether to accept or reject a transfer from the donor’s estate allows the donee to
independently assess the utility of the transfer.82 Although oftentimes, if not most of
the time, a transfer from the donor’s estate is beneficial to the donee,83 some transfers
would negatively affect the donee’s utility. 84 As the Supreme Court of Georgia
explained long ago, “Property is a burden as well as a benefit, and whoever is
unwilling to bear the burden for the sake of the benefit, is at liberty to decline both.”85
Freedom of inheritance therefore allows the donee to weigh the benefits and burdens
of the transfer, and if she decides that acceptance of the transfer would produce a net
negative change in her utility, she can disclaim her interest in the property.86
A donee might decide that a transfer from the donor’s estate would
detrimentally affect her utility for various reasons.87 Most simply, the property might
objectively be worthless. As Hirsch explains, “in the rare case where a bequest
comprises property of negative value,” freedom of inheritance allows the donee to
avoid the burdens of property that “no one will agree to take . . . off the beneficiary’s
hands.” 88 Alternatively, the donor might have subjective motivations, such as
religious, moral, or political reasons, for deciding to disclaim an interest in the
donor’s estate.89 As one New York court explains, “[I]nstitutions have been known

81

See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1147–50.
See Bender, supra note 78, at 898 (“[T]he belief prevails that the disclaimant should
not be forced to accept a gift if doing so would impose too great a burden on her. Essentially,
there is a general agreement and recognition that any individual using a disclaimer in this
manner possesses a valid motive.”).
83
See Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 694 (“One might think that very few sensible persons
decide to reject a gratuitous transfer . . . .”).
84
See Bender, supra note 78, at 898 (“[C]losely related to personal autonomy, is that
disclaimers protect an intended beneficiary’s need to reject burdensome property.”).
85
Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 707 (1879).
86
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 117 (“Only later, after feudal incidents were abolished,
did British courts come to allow disclaimers by devisees, for the very different purpose of
permitting beneficiaries to escape bequests that might be ‘clothed in trust,’ or otherwise
entail burdensome responsibilities.”).
87
See Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 709 (“The overall effect of a particular disclaimer
should be advantageous to the disclaimant; indeed, it is often extremely beneficial. One
commentator offers a list of twenty-seven different practical uses of disclaimers in different
contexts.”).
88
Hirsch, supra note 59, at 156 n.218; see Stephen E. Parker, Can Debtors Disclaim
Inheritances to the Detriment of Their Creditors?, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 31, 32 (1993) (“[A]
donee may want to reject a gift of property when the property is encumbered in an amount
greater than its fair market value . . . .”).
89
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 156 n.218.
82
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to spurn gifts via trust which the institutions deemed subversive or hostile to their
purposes or ideals. A like right extends to individuals.”90
Finally, the donee’s decision to disclaim an interest in the donor’s estate might
be driven, not by concerns regarding the property, but by a desire to be self-reliant.91
Under this scenario, the disutility of the transfer stems not from the particular object
of the gift but from the donative transfer generally. Thus, a transfer from the donor’s
estate might for various reasons be detrimental to the donee. Consequently, by
allowing the donee to accept only those transfers that are beneficial to her, the law’s
respect for the autonomy of the donee increases social welfare.
2. Donor Utility
In addition to maximizing the donee’s welfare by allowing her to assess the
utility of accepting a transfer from the donor’s estate, freedom of inheritance
maximizes the donor’s utility. This conclusion flows from the motivations that
underlie the donor’s decision to direct property to the donee after death.92 One reason
a donor might give a gift is to increase the utility of the donee.93 As Kelly explains,
“A gift . . . may increase the donor’s happiness due to altruism. If a donor is
altruistic, the donor’s utility is a function of the donees’ utility, i.e., the preferences
of the donor incorporate the well-being of the donees.”94 Put differently, under this
scenario, the utility of the donor is tied to the utility of the donee. If the donee’s
utility increases as a result of the transfer, the donor’s utility also increases, and,
likewise, if the donee’s utility decreases, the donor’s utility decreases. Therefore,
when the donor is motivated by altruism, freedom of inheritance maximizes social
welfare because if the donee were forced to accept a burdensome gift, not only would
the donee’s utility be diminished, but so too would the donee’s.

90

In re Estate of Suter, 142 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1955). The court makes
its point more eloquently: “Centuries ago, the Roman poet, Lucretius, enunciated the truism
that, ‘What is food to one may be fierce poison to others.’ To [some] donee[s] [a] gift is not
food, but a cup of hemlock which the law cannot force [them] to swallow.” Id.
91
See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 629.
92
See Barbara H. Fried, Who Gets Utility from Bequests? The Distributive and Welfare
Implications for a Consumption Tax, 51 STAN. L. REV. 641, 656 (1999) (“The various
motives for bequest savings . . . carry quite different implications for the utility derived from
bequests . . . .”); Louis Kaplow, On The Taxation of Private Transfers, 63 TAX L. REV. 159,
176 (2009) (“[V]ariations in donor’s motives for giving often do matter, both for predicting
behavior and for performing welfare analysis.”).
93
See SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 58 (“A major motivation of giving a gift is pure
altruism: The donor cares about the well-being of the donee; that is, the donor obtains utility
from the utility of the donee.”); Kaplow, supra note 92, at 176 (“One possibility is that donors
are to an extent altruistic, which is to say that raising the utility of their donees increases their
own utility. Altruism seems to be evidenced, for example, by parents’ hard work aimed to
improve their children’s prospects in life.”).
94
Kelly, supra note 1, at 1148–49; see Fried, supra note 92, at 665 (explaining the
same concept).
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Even if the donor is not motivated by altruism but is instead motivated by selfinterest, freedom of inheritance likely increases social welfare. When self-interest
drives the donor’s decision to give a testamentary gift, the donor receives benefit
from the mere act of giving and not necessarily from the increased utility that the
donee experiences as a result of the gift.95 The utility of the donor is not tied to the
utility of the donee.96 In this situation, freedom of inheritance allows the donee to
maximize her utility by choosing which transfers from the donor’s estate positively
affect her well-being.97 At the same time, the donee’s option to reject the gift likely
does not decrease the donor’s utility because the disclaimed property will be
distributed to an alternate donee. 98 The donor still receives the satisfaction of
knowing that she is making a gift even if the identity of the donee might change.
Thus, when the donor is motivated by self-interest, freedom of inheritance
maximizes social welfare because the donor’s utility is maximized and the donor’s
utility likely is unaffected.
A third potential motivation underlying the donor’s decision to make a
testamentary gift is that the donor feels obligated to make the transfer. Under this
scenario, the donor’s transfer is not necessarily donative in nature but is instead part
of an exchange with the donee.99 As Professor Barbara Fried explains,
The implicit contract hypothesized under the exchange motive theory
assumes that the donor pays on the honor system for services rendered:
Kids care for their aging parents for years, in exchange for an implicit
promise from their parents to pay for their services on a deferred basis at
the parents’ death.100
Within this context, the donee’s freedom of inheritance does not reduce the donor’s
utility because she receives the benefit of the implicit bargain regardless of whether
the donee accepts or rejects a transfer from her estate. Indeed, if the donor is solely
motivated by a perceived obligation to reciprocate a benefit conferred by the donee,
the donor should be indifferent to whether the donor disclaims an interest in her
95

See Kaplow, supra note 92, at 176–77 (“Another motivation is that donors obtain
pleasure not from the enhancement in their donees’ well-being but rather from the fact that
they, the donors themselves, have made the gift. That is, they get utility from giving per se.”);
Kelly, supra note 1, at 1148 (“If the happiness is related to mere self-interest, a donor obtains
satisfaction from the act of giving itself.”).
96
See SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 58 (“[T]he act of giving itself may supply utility to
the donor, independently of the degree of satisfaction it renders the donee.”).
97
See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
98
See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
99
See Kaplow, supra note 92, at 177 (“Another important possibility is that transfers
are not true gifts but really only one side of an exchange transaction. For example, parents
may give more to children as implicit or explicit compensation for services, such as in
providing care and attention.”); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1148 (“Other types of self-interested
giving may be based on exchange or reciprocity.”).
100
Fried, supra note 92, at 652.
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estate. Therefore, because the option to reject a transfer increases the donee’s utility
but does not decrease the donor’s utility,101 and may in fact increase the donor’s
utility,102 freedom of inheritance maximizes social welfare.
3. Moral Hazard
In addition to increasing the individual utility of both the donor and the donee,
freedom of inheritance maximizes social welfare by allowing the donee to engage
in postmortem estate planning.103 By providing the donee discretion to accept or
reject a transfer from the donor’s estate, the law allows the donee to make decisions
regarding the ultimate distribution of the donor’s property. To be sure, the donee
cannot select who receives the disclaimed property; instead, the donee who would
have taken the property had the disclaiming donee predeceased the donor enjoys the
benefit of the transfer.104 The donee does not select the alternate taker, but she does
make the decision whether to accept the transfer, thereby withholding the property
from the alternate taker, or to reject the transfer, thereby benefitting the alternate
taker rather than herself. In this way, the donee can make decisions regarding the
donor’s property that amount to estate planning after the donor’s death.
As explained previously, the law presumes that the donor is in the best position
to evaluate the utility of particular transfers and therefore generally relies upon the
donor to make decisions regarding her estate plan.105 Why then should the law not
unquestionably honor the donor’s decisions regarding the disposition of her
property? Put differently, why should the law allow the donee to second-guess the
donor’s exercise of freedom of disposition by granting her the ability to engage in
postmortem estate planning? The answer to these questions is that, although the
donor is in the best position to make decisions regarding her estate, there is no
guarantee that she will actually make rational, informed decisions.106 As Hirsch and
Wang explain, “[T]he assumption that [donors] will in general use freedom of
[disposition] to craft thoughtful schemes of distribution is not
unproblematic . . . . [The donor] may know best; but, alas, we have no assurance that
in practice he will do what is best.”107
As such, the rationale behind allowing the donee to engage in postmortem
estate planning is that, under certain circumstances, an estate plan is defective. As
Professor Joan Ellsworth explains, “Sometimes pre-death planning for a decedent’s
estate is nonexistent, poorly done, antiquated and out-of-date, or unfair in the

101

See supra notes 95–100 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 80–91 and accompanying text.
103
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 140 (“Disclaimers allow for postmortem estate planning.”).
104
See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
105
See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
106
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1138 (“Effectuating a donor’s ex ante interests is not
necessarily equivalent to maximizing social welfare.”).
107
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13.
102

300

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

opinion of the surviving family members.” 108 Freedom of inheritance allows the
donee to minimize the effect of these problems by tweaking the donor’s estate
plan.109 While the recognition that a donor does not always exercise her freedom of
disposition so as to increase social welfare explains why the law allows the donee to
engage in postmortem estate planning. It also raises the question of why the donor
might not make optimal decisions regarding the disposition of her estate.
One explanation of why the donor does not always make the best choices
regarding the distribution of her property upon death is that she will not bear the
costs of poor decisions.110 Because the donor will be dead at the time her decisions
take effect, she will not be present for the aftermath of her ineffective estate plan. If
her decisions produce results that are unfair or inefficient, she will not have to
observe her family and friends deal with the consequences of her actions. She will
not experience the frustration and disappointment of the people whom her decisions
effect,111 and she will not feel the regret of knowing that she could have avoided
many of the problems flowing from her defective estate plan through proper
planning. Because she will not bear the costs of her poor estate planning, the donor
has less incentive to make thoughtful decisions and plan accordingly.112
This situation in which a decision-maker is shielded from the costs of her
decisions is known as a moral hazard. 113 The paradigmatic example of a moral
108

Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 695; see Hirsch, supra note 59, at 156 n.218 (“[I]n a
surprising number of cases — a beneficiary may seek to bring about a distribution that better
accords with her understanding of what the testator wished but failed to accomplish, due to
intestacy or a failure to update the will.”).
109
See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1884 (“As a form of postmortem estate planning,
disclaimers preserve for poorly advised benefactors opportunities that their better-advised
counterparts already enjoy, effectively correcting the will retroactively.”); Hirsch, supra note
59, at 157–58 (“Execution of a disclaimer serves to cure a defective estate plan; and,
inevitably, the likelihood of poor estate planning increases in inverse proportion to the wealth
of the benefactor.”).
110
See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of
Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1294
(1999) (“If we cede to the dead the power to tell the living what to do with material resources
(that is, if we grant the right of testation), we encounter the obvious moral hazard problems
that arise whenever an actor knows that she will suffer no consequences from her actions.”);
see also David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 102 (2012) (“[T]he
consequence-free nature of testation creates a risk of moral hazard.”).
111
See Harry Hibschman, Whimsies of Will-Makers, 66 U.S. L. REV. 362, 362 (1932)
(“[A] will is a man’s one sure chance to have the last word. In it he can vent his spite in
safety without his victims having a chance to answer back.”).
112
See David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 572 (2014) (explaining
that “the dead do not experience the consequences of their decisions” and consequently there
is “the fear that people act less soberly in making decisions that will take effect only after
their demise”).
113
See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISES OF
2008 63 (2009) (explaining that “the term,” moral hazard “refer[s] to any situation in which
one person makes decisions about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost
if things go badly”).
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hazard problem involves insurance.114 For instance, when an individual purchases a
home, she is likely concerned about the possibility of loss due to fire. Consequently,
she has an incentive to take precautions to minimize the risk of fire, such as
purchasing a fire extinguisher or being careful when she uses the fireplace to heat
her home. Above and beyond these precautions, the homeowner may also purchase
insurance to protect against potential loss due to fire. The insurance provides the
homeowner peace of mind that she will be compensated if her house burns down,
but it also reduces her incentive to be vigilant against the risk of fire.115 Knowing
that she will not bear the cost of replacing her home if a fire occurs, she may be less
concerned about having a fire extinguisher on hand or less careful when using the
fireplace. 116 In this way, fire insurance creates a moral hazard because the
homeowner has less incentive to protect against the risk of loss.
To understand how the moral hazard problem arises in the context of estate
planning, contrast the cost of bad estate planning decisions with the cost of bad
lifetime donative decisions. If a donor makes poor choices regarding how to transfer
property during life, she will suffer the negative consequences of those choices.117
She will see the imprudent donee squander her gifts. She will observe the individual
whom she chose not to benefit, struggle financially. She will bear the unhappiness
and frustration of disappointed individuals who did not benefit from her generosity.
These potential costs of poor decision-making serve as a check on the lifetime donor
and provide her an incentive to think carefully about her donative decisions. These
costs, however, do not affect the donor who plans for the disposition of property
upon death. As Hirsch explains, “[A] testator may lack incentives at death to
distribute efficiently the assets he has amassed during life.”118 This is true because
“[w]hen persons act during their lifetimes, they must live with the consequences.
But persons acting at the moment of death, quite literally, do not: They are free to
114

Id. at 62 (“The term ‘moral hazard’ has its origins in the insurance industry. Very
early in the game providers of fire insurance, in particular, noticed that property owners who
were fully insured against loss had an interesting tendency to have destructive fires.”).
115
See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 537 (1986) (“To the extent that insurance covers losses, actors have less incentive to
avoid them, either by taking actions that diminish the probability of loss or by behaving in
manner that reduces the amount of loss.”); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a
Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer’s Guide to Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1671–72 (1974) (“The owner of insurance tends to behavior in a way
which increases the probability and magnitude of the adverse event against which he is
insuring himself.”).
116
See Kaplow, supra note 115, at 537 (“Fire insurance illustrates [the problem of
moral hazard]: full, unconditional coverage diminishes incentives to install costly fire
protection devices.”); Polinsky, supra note 115, at 1672 (“[A] homeowner with fire insurance
is less likely to buy fire resistant rugs or curtains, install a home sprinkler system, or dispose
of his oil-soaked rags.”).
117
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13 (“Living persons suffer the consequences
that follow their actions.”).
118
Hirsch, supra note 7, at 639; see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13 (“[A] testator
may . . . lack inhibitions at death that tempered her course of conduct during life.”).
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act ‘irresponsibly’ without paying any of the economic or interpersonal costs that
living persons must bear for such behavior.”119 This consequence of estate planning
has been referred to as the “moral hazard of testation.”120
Thus, the same disincentives that insurance creates for the homeowner are
created by the death of the donor. Under both scenarios, the decision-maker has less
incentive to make appropriate choices because she will not bear the cost of poor
decisions. The homeowner might not take proper precautions because she will not
bear the cost of repairing or rebuilding her home. Likewise, the donor might not
exercise her freedom of disposition with adequate thought and careful deliberation
because she will be dead at the time her decisions take effect. The careless exercise
of freedom of disposition can result in an estate plan that is suboptimal from a social
welfare perspective. Without proper reflection, the donor might not consider how
best to distribute her property or she might inaccurately assess the utility that her
estate plan produces. Therefore, in part because the donor’s decision-making process
is distorted by the moral hazard of testation, the law allows the donee to question the
decisions that the donor has made. Indeed, the donee’s ability to assess the donor’s
decisions and to disclaim property if alternate donees would receive greater utility
from particular transfers allows the donee to increase the social welfare efficiency
of the donor’s estate plan.
4. Imperfect Information
In addition to alleviating the moral hazard problem that results from the donor
making decisions that will take effect only after she dies, 121 postmortem estate
planning through the exercise of freedom of inheritance maximizes social welfare
by addressing issues of imperfect information. As just mentioned, the law relies
upon the donor to make decisions regarding her estate plan because she likely has
the best information to make such decisions.122 However, because the donor makes
estate planning decisions during her lifetime that do not become effective until after
she dies, she sometimes makes these decisions without all the relevant information
regarding the needs of her friends and family.123 When the donor exercises freedom
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Hirsch, supra note 7, at 639; see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13.
E.g., Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13; Hirsch, supra note 7, at 639; Horton,
supra note 112, at 572.
121
See supra Part II.B.3.
122
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136.
123
See Richard C. Ausness, Sherlock Holmes and the Problem of the Dead Hand: The
Modification and Termination of “Irrevocable” Trusts, 28 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 237, 295
(2015) (“According to one school of thought, imperfect information, particularly about future
events and circumstances, may cause donors to make disposition of their property that they
would not have made had they been better prognosticators. Unfortunately, once the donor is
dead, such decisions cannot be reversed.”).
120
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of disposition with imperfect information, she might craft an estate plan that is
suboptimal from a social welfare perspective.124
Two specific examples of this general scenario illustrate the problem of
imperfect information and the role that freedom of inheritance plays in postmortem
estate planning. The first involves an insolvent donee. 125 Imagine a situation in
which the donor directs a gift to a donee who has amassed significant debts. If, under
this scenario, the donee could not disclaim the transfer, the donee’s creditors would
benefit from the transfer rather than the donee herself. 126 From the donee’s
perspective, the transfer might have greater utility when it is disclaimed and benefits
an alternate donee, who is likely a close family member,127 rather than when it is
accepted and ultimately flows to the donee’s creditors.128 Certainly, the donee would
receive the benefit of at least partially extinguishing her debts if she were to accept
the transfer, but the same result is available to her through bankruptcy.129 Therefore,
if the donee considers the alternate donee’s welfare, she would choose to disclaim
the transfer if the alternate donee’s increased utility is greater than her utility from
foregoing bankruptcy.

124
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1158 (“Future events are difficult to foresee and
unanticipated contingencies may arise. As a result, a donor may dispose of property in a way
that contradicts what the donor would have wanted with complete information.”); see also
David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1703
(2009) (“Even the savviest investor cannot predict how to allocate assets efficiently in the
distant future.”). A donee’s mere willingness to disclaim a transfer from the donor’s estate,
suggests that the donor crafted her estate plan without the necessary information to make
informed decisions regarding the disposition of her property. See Reid Kress Weisbord,
Federalizing Principles of Donative Intent and Unanticipated Circumstances, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 1931, 1936 (2014) (“Had the donor known of the circumstances causing the original
beneficiary to disclaim, the donor presumably would have skipped the original beneficiary
altogether in favor of the next eligible beneficiary.”).
125
See generally Hirsch, supra note 7.
126
See Parker, supra note 88, at 32 (“[I]f the law did not allow disclaimers, the
testator’s property could end up in the hands of the devisee’s creditors, thus clearly
frustrating the testator’s intent.”).
127
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 116 (“By consulting the will or the intestacy statute, a
beneficiary can predetermine who will take in her place should she choose to disclaim—
often a close relative.”).
128
See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 632 (“A beneficiary who anticipates bankruptcy or a
workout may be able to improve his position by disclaiming (and thereby preserving for his
relatives or for surreptitious personal enjoyment) property that would otherwise go to satisfy
his debts that will be discharged or forgiven away.”). But see Weisbord, supra note 124, at
1936 n.22 (“[A]n insolvent beneficiary might not disclaim if the next to take is not a close
relative. From the insolvent beneficiary’s perspective, it would be better to retain the
inheritance to repay creditors than to allow it to pass to an unrelated their party.”).
129
See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1909 (“[T]he petition for relief in bankruptcy
ordinarily marks the ‘line of cleavage’ between prepetition accumulations of property that
the debtor must surrender to creditors and postpetition accumulations that a discharged
debtor gets to keep as his or her ‘fresh start’ . . . .”).
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Likewise, from the donor’s perspective, a disclaimer by the insolvent donee
likely increases the utility of the transfer because the donor’s probable intent is
fulfilled.130 As Hirsch explains,
[T]he disclaimer fulfills the implicit intent of the benefactor, at least in
those instances where the amount of the inheritance does not dwarf the
debt. Few benefactors would want their savings to go [to] a beneficiary’s
creditors, given that the beneficiary can seek a discharge of his or her debts
in bankruptcy, extinguishing them otherwise.131
Put differently, if presented this situation at the time she crafted her estate plan, the
donor would have undertaken a comparative analysis of the utility that the primary
donee would receive from the transfer and the utility that the alternate taker would
receive from the transfer, and she likely would have concluded that the alternate
donee should receive the transfer rather the primary donee’s creditors.132
Because the donor likely would not want her property to end up in the hands of
a donee’s creditors, 133 a donor who directs property to an insolvent donee likely
possessed imperfect information at the time she crafted her estate plan. Either the
donor did not know that the donee was insolvent at the time she made her decisions
regarding her estate, or the donee was solvent at the time the donor crafted her estate
plan but subsequently amassed significant debts. Under either scenario, the donor
did not possess all relevant information necessary to craft her estate plan, and
consequently the law allows the donee to disclaim her interest in the donor’s estate
as a way to address this problem of imperfect information.
The second specific scenario in which the donor might inaccurately predict the
utility of a transfer because of the problem of imperfect information involves taxes.
Imagine a scenario in which the donor dies leaving behind a will that gives her entire
estate to her daughter A or, if A predeceases her, to A’s daughter, B.134 A is well off
130

See Bender, supra note 78, at 898 (“The goal behind such a disclaimer is to avoid
frustrating the wishes of the testator because of the beneficiary’s outstanding obligations.”);
Hirsch, supra note 7, at 632 (“Along with the intent of the beneficiary, one has also to
consider the intent of the benefactor. Several opinions defend the right of insolvent
disclaimer on the ground that to compel acceptance would violate the ‘probable intent’ of
the testator, who ‘sought to benefit the distributee and not a public or private creditor.’ In
order to carry out the benefactor’s probable intent, the beneficiary’s right of disclaimer must
be assured.”).
131
Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1884.
132
But see Bender, supra note 78, at 901 (“[I]t is no less likely that a testator intends to
help the devisee pay off debts and begin anew.”); Hirsch, supra note 7, at 632 (“Conceivably,
some patriarchs might see the matter differently. They might specifically intend that their
legacies be used to stave bankruptcy, whether to avoid the resulting family stigma or simply
out of ‘old-time conscientiousness.”).
133
See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text.
134
This is a variant of a simple example. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at
141. However, tax consequences can influence the donee’s decision to disclaim in more
complex situations. See Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 709–10.
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and would prefer that B, who is young and not as financially secure, take the donor’s
estate instead. One option to accomplish this result is for A to accept the transfer
from the donor and then to make a separate transfer to B. Another option is for A to
disclaim the transfer in which case she will be treated as predeceasing the donor and
B will take in her place. In this situation, the tax consequences of each scenario might
affect A’s decision to accept or to reject the transfer from the donor.135
The transfer of wealth is subject to federal taxation, and A’s two options for
directing the donor’s estate to B have different tax consequences. If A chooses the
first option and accepts the donor’s estate, this initial transfer between the donor and
A is subject to federal wealth transfer taxes; likewise, the secondary transfer between
A and B will also be taxed.136 Thus, A’s acceptance of the donor’s estate ultimately
produces two taxable transfers. By contrast, if A chooses the second option and
disclaims the transfer from the donor, federal tax laws will treat the scenario as
producing only one taxable transfer.137 In this situation, the law views the estate as
passing from the donor directly to B, and therefore, instead of being taxed twice, the
transfer of the donor’s property is only taxed once.138 Therefore, under both options,
the donor’s estate ends up in the hands of B, but A’s disclaimer of the transfer is
more efficient because it produces less tax liability than a separate transfer from A
to B.139
When the donor leaves behind an estate plan that is inefficient from a tax
perspective, there is a strong indication that the donor did not know the tax
implications of the disposition of her property.140 Perhaps tax laws changed in the
time intervening the preparation of her estate plan and her death in ways that

135

See Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 710 (explaining that even if “the amount of . . . tax
imposed . . . is insubstantial,” tax liability can influence the donee’s decision to disclaim
because “any amount of tax is important to family members”).
136
See id. at 695–96 (“[A] valid disclaimer results in one gratuitous transfer (from the
transferor to the substituted taker) while an invalid disclaimer, or no disclaimer, may
occasion two transfers (from the transferor to the would-be disclaimant, and then from the
disclaimant to the substituted taker).”).
137
See I.R.C. § 2518(a) (West 2016) (“[I]f a person makes a qualified disclaimer with
respect to any interest in property, this subtitle shall apply with respect to such interest as if
the interest had never been transferred to such person.”).
138
To avoid federal transfer tax liability in this situation, the disclaimer must be made
within a specified timeframe. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 141–42 (“To
qualify under the federal tax code, the disclaimer must be made within nine months after the
interest is created or after the donee reaches 21, whichever is later.”).
139
See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 629 (“The most common modern inducement for
disclaimer is family wealth planning.” By disclaiming, the donee “may succeed in skipping
a generation’s worth of inheritance taxes.”); Hirsch, supra note 59, at 116 (“Assuming [the
donee] has ties of benevolence to [the alternate donee], she may calculate that a direct transfer
from the benefactor to that alternative beneficiary, accomplished via a disclaimer, is from
the standpoint of the family as a whole more tax efficient than, and possibly therefore
preferable to, the transfer that would otherwise occur from the benefactor to herself.”).
140
See Weisbord, supra note 124, at 1935–36.
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rendered her estate plan inefficient.141 Even if the donor knew or could have known
of changes in the tax laws, the donor cannot know everything necessary to craft an
efficient estate plan. As Ellsworth explains, “[t]wo important factors [that affect the
tax efficiency of an estate plan] can never be known with certainty before a taxable
transfer occurs: the timing of an individual’s death and the final value of a
transferor’s estate.”142 She argues that “hindsight is a valuable tool” to address this
inherent uncertainty of estate planning and that the right to disclaim “gives family
members and personal representatives the flexibility they need to take full advantage
of various beneficial provisions in state and federal tax laws.”143
Thus, freedom of inheritance can be seen as a safeguard against the donor’s
exercise of freedom of disposition with imperfect information. Because, at the time
she crafts her estate plan, the donor cannot perfectly assess the ultimate utility of a
transfer from her estate, the law allows the donee to reassess the transfer after the
donor’s death. Put simply, the donee has better information, and consequently, the
law allows the donee to adjust the donor’s estate plan to account for this better
information.144 With the benefit of hindsight, the donee can increase the utility of
the transfer, and therefore, freedom of inheritance can be seen as a tool to maximize
social welfare.
5. Transaction Costs
In addition to addressing problems of moral hazard and imperfect
information, 145 postmortem estate planning through the exercise of freedom of
inheritance can reduce transaction costs. Imperfect information may render an estate
plan ineffective because the donor might simply not know all the relevant
considerations to accurately assess the utility of particular transfers.146 However, an
estate plan can be defective even when the donor possesses perfect information. For
example, a donor might be aware that a donee is insolvent, and she might recognize
that a transfer to an alternate taker would produce greater utility because the
transferred property would not be used to satisfy the donee’s debts. Nevertheless,

141

See Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 712 (“Changes in the tax laws may also necessitate
a disclaimer. A dispositive instrument is drafted based on existing conditions, and it cannot
reflect laws enacted after its execution.”).
142
Id. at 713 (suggesting that the problem of imperfect information can affect the
donor’s ability “to maximize the benefit from such tax-saving techniques as equalizing
spouses’ estates, adopting the alternate valuation date or utilizing the credit for tax on prior
transfers.”).
143
Id.
144
See Weisbord, supra note 124, at 1935–36 (“Because most donors want to achieve
efficient estate planning and protect their estates from collection by tax authorities and
creditors, we presume a donor with full knowledge of the relevant circumstances at death
would approve of or, more likely, prefer the beneficiary’s decision to disclaim rather take.”).
145
See supra Parts II.B.3–4.
146
See supra text accompanying notes 124–143.
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the donor might not implement this change and direct the transfer away from the
insolvent donee because she might incur transaction costs to do so.147
The donor’s act of changing her estate plan involves the time and effort of
executing a will or other donative document that reflects her new intent. 148
Oftentimes, this act also involves consultation with a lawyer,149 which has monetary
costs. The time, money, and effort of implementing a change to the donor’s estate
plan, represent the transaction costs of the donor’s decision to redirect a transfer in
a way that produces greater utility,150 such as by directing a transfer away from an
insolvent donee and to an alternate taker. In addition to transaction costs in the form
of time and money, the act of changing an estate plan has psychological costs.151
The donor must confront her own mortality when making decisions regarding the
disposition of her property upon death, 152 and consequently, estate planning can
produce fear, anxiety, and other negative psychological and emotional
consequences.153
Therefore, even if the donor has perfect information with which to assess the
utility of different transfers, she might not change her estate plan to implement
transfers of higher utility. When making her decision, she will weigh the transaction
costs of changing her estate plan with the benefit of the new transfer. If the increased
147

See Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous Transfers and Contractual Transfers:
A Situational Theory, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 834 n.182 (2014) (explaining that
“transaction costs impede” the amendment of wills); Adam J. Hirsch, Incomplete Wills, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (2012) (suggesting that there are “transaction cost[s] of executing
a will”).
148
See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of its
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1039 (2004) (“For contractual theorists, default rules
serve to minimize the expense of bargaining. Gratuitous transfers do not ordinarily involve
bargaining, to be exact, but they do entail drafting and formalization, in the form of a will.”).
149
See Schenkel, supra note 10, at 179 (“The public in general perceives the will as a
document that is formally technical enough that many people, if not most, seek the services
of a lawyer in having one drawn up.”).
150
See Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 747, 837 (2015)
(explaining that estate planning “entails transaction costs, including estate planning lawyers
and a significant time investment”); Weisbord, supra note 2, at 879 (“[T]he complexity of
the will-making process deters the exercise of testamentary freedom by imposing substantial
transaction costs, including the cost of professional counsel or the investment of time
necessary to prepare a proper will . . . .”).
151
See Hirsch, supra note 148, at 1050 (“[P]sychological barriers accompany
transaction costs, conspiring to impede the testamentary process.”); see also Mark Glover,
The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 139, 145 (2012)
(explaining that the “antitherapeutic consequences” of estate planning “may dissuade the
testator from completing her estate plan and may impair the testator’s decision-making
capabilities”).
152
See Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Fill-in Will Forms – The First Decade: Theoretical
Constructs and Empirical Findings, 72 OR. L. REV. 769, 778 (1993) (“Many persons are
intellectually aware that estate planning is necessary, but find it emotionally difficult to
confront the fragility of life and health.”).
153
See Glover, supra note 7, at 434–38; Hirsch, supra note 148, at 1047–50.
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utility of the new transfer outweighs her transaction costs, she will change her estate
plan. Conversely, if the transaction costs outweigh the increased utility of the
alternate transfer, the donor will not make the change. Her estate plan will remain
as is, and the higher utility transfer will not occur. The transaction costs associated
with implementing an estate plan therefore may prevent the donor from distributing
her property in a way that maximizes social welfare.
In part to address this issue, the law grants the donee freedom of inheritance.
Indeed, postmortem estate planning can be seen as a mechanism that reduces the
transactions costs of directing the donor’s property in ways that increase the overall
utility of her estate plan. Allowing the donee to adjust the donor’s estate plan through
the exercise of freedom of inheritance can reduce transaction costs in two ways.
First, postmortem estate planning can reduce transaction costs because the costs
borne by the donee after donor’s death are likely smaller than the costs borne by the
donor during life. The focus of a disclaimer is narrow, encompassing only the
particular property flowing to the donee.154 By contrast, the focus of a will is much
broader, involving not only the disposition of potentially all of the donor’s property
but also other issues, such as the appointment of executors and guardians of minor
children. 155 Because of a will’s greater complexity and broader scope, the
preparation of a disclaimer likely involves less time, effort, and money than the
planning, drafting, and execution of a will.156
Additionally, the donee’s transaction costs are likely smaller than the donor’s
because postmortem estate planning minimizes the psychological toll of estate
planning. The donor’s act of estate planning forces her to acknowledge the
inevitability of death and therefore can produce negative psychological
consequences.157 By contrast, to undertake postmortem estate planning, the donee
must not confront her own mortality. Instead, the donee must simply make a decision
regarding the disposition of the donor’s property. To be sure, the donee must make
these decisions during a time when she might still be mourning the loss of a loved

154

See supra text accompanying notes 58–65.
See Percy Bordwell, Testamentary Dispositions, 19 KY. L.J. 283, 283 (1931) (“A
will may be defined as the means whereby one disposes of his property at his death or
appoints an executor or a guardian for his orphan child or does any combination of these
things.”).
156
The donor may be able to reduce transaction costs by narrowly altering an estate
plan through the execution of a codicil that amends a preexisting will. See Adam J. Hirsch,
Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 614
(2009) (“Ordinarily, amending a will by codicil is simple and inexpensive . . . .”). However,
the transaction costs of a codicil may still prevent the donor from updating her estate plan.
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13 (“Wills frequently mature years after they are
executed, and the costs (both economic and psychological) of adding codicils may deter
testators from updating estate plans to take into account changed circumstances. Estate plans
become increasingly stale as time passes, and due to human inertia they tend to remain so.”).
157
See supra text accompanying notes 151–153.
155
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one. 158 However, the psychological and emotional consequences that the donee
endures as a result of the donor’s death occur whether or not she considers the utility
of postmortem estate planning. Postmortem estate planning may add to these
negative effects,159 but this additional stress and anxiety is likely less than the donor
experiences as a result of estate planning during life.160
Not only does postmortem estate planning likely reduce the transaction costs
of a single act of estate planning, but it also decreases the need to undertake multiple
acts of estate planning. In order for the donor to ensure that her estate plan is up-todate, she must continuously amend her estate plan as circumstances change over the
course of her life.161 Each time she does, she incurs transaction costs, which can
accumulate the longer that she lives and the more circumstances change. By contrast,
the donee exercises freedom of inheritance after the donor’s death. Circumstances
affecting the utility of the donor’s estate plan are not in flux when the donee assesses
the utility of the transfer from the donor’s estate,162 and consequently the donee must
bear the transaction costs of exercising her freedom of inheritance only once. The
donee’s single postmortem estate planning experience therefore likely produces
fewer overall transaction costs than the successive line of estate planning events that
the donor must undertake to ensure that her estate plan reflects current
circumstances.
In sum, the donor’s freedom of inheritance can be explained as a component of
the law of succession that maximizes social welfare. It accomplishes this goal in
various ways. First, the discretion to accept or to reject a transfer from the donor’s
estate increases the donee’s utility.163 In particular, freedom of inheritance allows
the donee to independently assess the utility of a transfer and to accept only those
transfers that she perceives to be worthwhile. If the donee determines that a transfer
from the donor’s estate would actually produce negative utility, she can reject the
transfer. Second, the donee’s freedom of inheritance can increase the donor’s
158

See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 153 n.209 (“[D]isclaimers are contemplated at a time
when the beneficiary is often gripped with emotions – in this case, grief brought on by her
benefactor’s death, or even feelings of guilt over receiving the inheritance . . . .”).
159
Any involvement that the donee has in the administration of the donor’s estate can
produce stress and anxiety during the grieving process. See Glover, supra note 7, at 442.
However, the ability to engage in postmortem estate planning may actually reduce the
donee’s emotional toll because she can take comfort in knowing that her actions aided in the
efficient distribution of the donor’s estate.
160
But see Hirsch, supra note 59, at 153 n.209 (suggesting that the donee’s emotional
discomfort is “at least as powerful as [that] experienced by the prospective donor of a gift.”).
161
See Walker v. Walker, 14 Ohio St. 157, 173 (Ohio 1862) (“[T]he circumstances of
a testator, and the character, fortunes and wants of the natural objects of his bounty, are
subject to constant change. To-day a testator makes his will; to-morrow a daughter is
widowed, or a son is crippled; and so, what would be reasonable in a will to-day, becomes
unreasonable by the accident of to-morrow.”).
162
The idea that changed circumstances are not a concern after the donor’s death is
related to the notion that the donee may have better information regarding the utility of the
donor’s estate plan after the donor’s death. See supra notes 122–143 and accompany text.
163
See supra Part II.B.1.
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utility. 164 The donor’s utility is frequently tied to the donee’s utility, so that the
donor’s utility increases when the donee’s utility increases. Consequently, the
donee’s ability to reject transfers that she determines to be detrimental may increase
the donor’s utility because the donor has assurance that a transfer from her estate
will in fact benefit the donee. Finally, freedom of inheritance allows the donee to
undertake postmortem estate planning.165 The donee’s ability to adjust the donor’s
estate plan after the donor’s death addresses problems of moral hazard, imperfect
information, and transaction costs.
III. FACILITATING THE FREEDOM
Freedom of disposition is the fundamental principle of the modern law of
succession because it is viewed as maximizing social welfare. 166 Therefore, the
law’s primary goal is to promote the donor’s exercise of this freedom by carrying
out her intended estate plan.167 As the Restatement explains, “The main function of
the law in this field is to facilitate rather than regulate. The law serves this function
by establishing rules under which sufficiently reliable determinations can be made
regarding the content of the donor’s intention.”168 As the previous section argued,
164

See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.3–5.
166
See supra Part I.
167
See Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case Against
Holographic Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 96 (2006) (“The primary goal of the American law
of wills is the effectuation of the decedent’s testamentary intent.”); Ashbel G. Gulliver &
Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1941) (“One
fundamental proposition is that, under a legal system recognizing the individualistic
institution of private property and granting to the owner the power to determine his
successors in ownership, the general philosophy of courts should favor giving effect to an
intentional exercise of that power.”); Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises:
Reliance, Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 553 n.1 (1999) (“Most
scholars agree that giving effect to testamentary intent is the primary objective of wills
law.”).
168
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c
(AM. LAW INST. 2003); see UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-102 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) (stating that one of the “underlying purposes and policies” of
the law of succession is “to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in
distribution of his property”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“This section implements this fundamental
principle by stating two well-accepted propositions: (1) that the controlling consideration in
determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention; and (2) that the
donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.”); see also
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 1 (“Most of the law of succession is concerned
with enabling posthumous enforcement of the actual intent of the decedent or, failing this,
giving effect to the decedent’s probable intent.”); Weisbord, supra note 2, at 877–78 (“The
polestar of American inheritance law, testamentary freedom is a right protected by the U.S.
Constitution, and once it is exercised, courts go to great lengths to implement the decedent’s
intent by closely honoring and interpreting testamentary instructions.”). Although the term
165
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freedom of inheritance also plays an important role in maximizing social welfare.169
As such, just as the law facilitates the donor’s exercise of freedom of disposition,
the law should also strive to facilitate the donee’s exercise of freedom of inheritance.
This section therefore analyzes how the law should facilitate the donee’s exercise of
this freedom, and it does so by placing the law’s facilitative goal squarely within the
social welfare model developed in previous sections of this Article. Specifically, this
section examines three primary areas in which the law can facilitate freedom of
inheritance, including (A) the process by which the donee exercises her freedom,
(B) the timeframe during which the donee must make her decision whether to accept
or to reject a transfer from the donor, and (C) the restrictions that the law places on
the donee’s freedom.170
A. Formalization
The law facilitates the exercise of freedom of disposition by providing a
process through which the probate court can authenticate wills. If the court routinely
validates inauthentic wills or conversely invalidates genuine wills, then freedom of
disposition is undermined because the donor’s property is distributed in unintended
ways.171 In turn, if property is distributed in unintended ways, then the social welfare
benefits of freedom of disposition go unrealized. Traditionally, the law distinguishes
authentic wills from inauthentic wills by requiring the donor to comply with a variety
of will-execution formalities, such as the requirements that a will be written, signed,
and witnessed.172 If the donor complies with these formalities, the court presumes

“testamentary intent” is commonly used to refer to the intent of the donor, the law is
concerned with different types of intent in different contexts. See generally, Mark Glover, A
Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 569, 581–99 (2016).
169
See supra Part II.
170
This is, of course, not an exhaustive list of potential areas in which the law could
facilitate the exercise of freedom of inheritance. See Adam J. Hirsch, The Code Breakers:
How States Are Modifying the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, 46 REAL PROP.
TR. & EST. L.J. 325, 326 (2011) (“[D]isclaimer statutes must answer any number of
subsidiary questions: How long after a benefactor dies can a disclaimer occur; what
formalities must a beneficiary who wishes to disclaim follow; who, if anyone, can disclaim
on a beneficiary’s behalf; what events operate to bar a disclaimer; and what alternative
devolution results from a disclaimer?”). For example, other areas in which the facilitative
goal of the law should be explored include conditional disclaimers and ineffective
disclaimers. See id. at 358–61.
171
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 148 (explaining that “[b]oth kinds of
error dishonor the decedent’s freedom of disposition” and that “[t]he former gives effect to
a false expression of testamentary intent” while “the latter denies effect to a true expression
of testamentary intent”); see generally Mark Glover, Probate-Error Costs, 49 CONN. L. REV.
613 (2016).
172
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 147–49; Mark Glover, Formal
Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s Family Protection Policy,
34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411, 423–25 (2009).
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that she intended the will to be a legally effective expression of her estate plan, but
if the donor does not comply, the court determines that the will is inauthentic.173
Similarly, if the court makes incorrect determinations regarding whether the
donee accepted or rejected a transfer from the donor’s estate, then the donee’s
freedom of inheritance is undermined and the social welfare benefits of the freedom
are lost. The law therefore provides the donee a process through which she can
reliably exercise her discretion to accept or to reject a transfer from the donor’s
estate.174 In this regard, the manner in which the donee exercises her freedom of
inheritance is comparable to the process by which the donor exercises her freedom
of disposition. Because most donees want to benefit from the donor’s estate,175 the
law presumes that a donee will accept a transfer from the donor, and consequently,
the donee must take some affirmative steps to reject the transfer.176 Similar to the
formalities of will execution, the law requires the disclaimant to comply with certain
formalities to exercise her discretion to reject an interest in the donor’s property.177
For instance, all states require that the donee express her intent to disclaim a gift in
a written document, 178 and most states also require the donee to sign the
document. 179 A small number of states require that the disclaimant comply with
173
When the decedent complies with the formalities of will execution, a rebuttable
presumption of authenticity is triggered, meaning that the court will consider extrinsic
evidence that suggests the decedent did not intend the will to be legally effective. See Mark
Glover, Minimizing Probate-Error Risk, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 363–66 (2016)
[hereinafter Glover, Probate-Error Risk]. By contrast, when the decedent does not comply
with the formalities of will execution, a conclusive presumption of inauthenticity is triggered,
meaning the court will not consider extrinsic evidence that suggests the decedent intended
the will to be legally effective. See Mark Glover, Rethinking the Testamentary Capacity of
Minors, 79 MO. L. REV. 69, 97–98 (2014).
174
See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT prefatory note (NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) (explaining that “the new Act is an
enabling statute”).
175
See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1873.
176
See In re Estate of Lyng, 608 N.W.2d 316, 319 (S.D. 2000) (“There exists a
generally recognized presumption of the acceptance of a beneficial testamentary gift.
Therefore, the renunciation of such a gift must be clear and unequivocal.”) (citations
omitted); Tennant v. Satterfield, 216 S.E.2d 229, 231–32 (W. Va. 1975) (“The general rule
with regard to acceptance of benefits under a will is that a beneficiary who accepts such
benefits is bound to adopt the whole contents of that will and is estopped to challenge its
validity. Acceptance of a beneficial legacy or transfer is presumed, but the presumption is
rebuttable by express rejection of the benefits or by acts inconsistent with acceptance.”)
(citation omitted).
177
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 149–54; Hirsch, supra note 170, at 361–62.
178
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 149.
179
See id. at 149 n.187. These additional requirements are typically incorporated into
disclaimer formalities through a requirement that a disclaimer be acknowledged in the
manner required for the recordation of deeds. For example, the Florida disclaimer statute
provides: “To be effective, a disclaimer must be in writing, declare the writing as a
disclaimer, describe the interest or power disclaimed, and be signed by the person making
the disclaimer and witnessed and acknowledged in the manner provided for deeds of real
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additional formalities, such as notarization or attestation by witnesses.180 Moreover,
in addition to formalizing a disclaimer in the prescribed manner, a donee must also
deliver the disclaimer either to the probate court or to the donor’s personal
representative.181
In order to maximize social welfare, the law’s goal should be to facilitate not
only the donor’s freedom of disposition but also the donee’s freedom of
inheritance. 182 As such, the formal processes that the donor and the donee must
navigate would seem to contradict the law’s facilitative goal because they limit the
manner in which the donor can exercise freedom of disposition and the donee can
exercise freedom of inheritance. After all, some donors and donees might want to
exercise their respective freedoms in other ways, such as by oral declaration,183 and
requiring them to execute wills or to disclaim gifts in a prescribed manner would
seem to restrict rather than facilitate the exercise of their freedoms. Because they
limit the manner in which the donor can exercise freedom of disposition and the
donee can exercise freedom of inheritance, the formalities for executing a will and
disclaiming a gift should serve some purpose related to the maximization of social
welfare.
Within the context of will execution, the primary purpose of the prescribed
formalities is to further the law’s facilitative goal by providing the court reliable
evidence that the donor intended a will to be legally effective.184 Because a will takes
effect only after the donor’s death, questions sometimes arise regarding whether the
donor intended a particular document to constitute a legally effective will. 185
estate to be recorded in this state.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 739.104(3) (West 2017); see also
C.G.S.A. § 45a-579(c) (West 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-1107 (West 2017); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 42-6-5(c) (West 2017).
180
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 149 n.187.
181
See id. (“State statutes also mandate either that beneficiaries file a written disclaimer
with the court, or that they deliver it to the personal representative, or they are permitted to
do either, or they are required to do both.”).
182
See supra Parts I.B. & II.B.
183
Today, a minority of states recognizes oral wills as legally effective under very
limited circumstances. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 148 n.3. Similarly,
“[u]nder the common law, a beneficiary could effect a binding disclaimer by mere oral
declaration.” Hirsch, supra note 59, at 149.
184
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt.
a (AM. LAW INST. 2003); (“The formalities are meant to facilitate [an] intent-serving purpose,
not to be ends in themselves.”); Champine, supra note 30, at 391–92 (“To facilitate
realization of testamentary freedom, the law historically has required individuals to set forth
dispositive desires in a written statement executed with formalities sufficient to identify to
the individual executing the instrument and the world at large that the writing is intended to
be a will.”).
185
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 147 (“A will is a peculiar legal
instrument . . . in that it does not take effect until after the testator dies. As a consequence,
probate courts follow what has been called a ‘worst evidence’ rule of procedure. The witness
who is best able to authenticate the will . . . is dead by the time the court considers such
issues.”).
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Consider, for example, a scenario in which a donor dies, and her family discovers a
handwritten note folded between the pages of the donor’s diary.186 The document
appears to describe how the donor wanted her property distributed upon death. But
how can the court be sure that the donor wanted her property distributed in the
manner described in the note? Perhaps the note is a rough draft that the donor had
no confidence in to truly reflect what she wanted. 187 Or perhaps the note was
fraudulently prepared by someone attempting to benefit from the donor’s estate.188
Because the donor is dead, the court cannot simply ask her whether she intended the
document to be a legally effective expression of her estate plan.189
To alleviate these evidentiary difficulties, the formal process of will execution
provides courts an easy and efficient way to distinguish authentic wills from
inauthentic wills. 190 Because most people would not go through the process of
producing a written will, signing it, and having it witnessed without intending it to
be legally effective, the donor’s compliance with the prescribed formalities provides
robust evidence that she intended the will to govern the distribution of her estate.191
Furthermore, the requirements that a will be written, signed, and witnessed, reduce
the likelihood of fraud.192 Thus, when the donor complies with the formalities of will
execution, the court can safely dispose of the donor’s estate according to the will’s
terms with little risk that it is distributing property in an unintended manner.193 The
primary purpose of will-execution formalities is therefore to ensure that the donor’s
property is distributed according to the terms of a will that the donor intended to be
legally effective,194 and, in this way, the formal process of will execution can be seen
as serving the law’s overall facilitative goal.
In addition to providing evidence that the donor intended a will to be legally
effective, the formalities of will execution also serve the secondary function of
cautioning the donor.195 As explained above, the law grants the donor broad freedom
of disposition because she is in the best position to make decisions regarding the
186

This example is inspired by In re Estate of Rigsby, 843 P.2d 856, 857 (Okla. Civ.
App. 1992).
187
See Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
597, 614 (2014).
188
See id. at 617.
189
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 167, at 4 (“These difficulties are entitled to
especially serious consideration in prescribing requirements for gratuitous transfers, because
the issue of the validity of the transfer is almost always raised after the alleged transferor is
dead, and therefore the main actor is usually unavailable to testify, or to clarify or contradict
other evidence concerning his all-important intention.”).
190
See Glover, supra note 187, at 614–16.
191
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 153.
192
See Glover, supra note 187, at 617–18.
193
See Glover, supra note 173, at 342–43.
194
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt.
a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The purpose of statutory formalities . . . is to determine whether
the decedent adopted the document as his or her will.”).
195
See Glover, supra note 187, at 621–23.
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distribution of her estate.196 However, even if the donor knows how best to distribute
her property, she might not actually craft her estate plan in a way that maximizes
social welfare.197 Because the donor’s decisions regarding the distribution of her
estate take effect only after she dies, she will not bear the costs of poor choices.198
This moral hazard of testation might cause the donor to not fully consider the
consequences of her actions,199 and, in turn, she might execute a will haphazardly
and without proper consideration.200 If the donor does not take the estate planning
process seriously, she might not dispose of her estate in a way that maximizes social
welfare.
The formal process of will execution provides a check against the donor
exercising freedom of disposition without adequate thought and proper preparation.
By requiring the donor to produce a written will, the law forecloses the possibility
that the donor will dispose of property through a haphazard oral declaration. 201
Likewise, the signature and witnessing requirements remind the donor that the act
of testation has legal significance and consequently encourages the donor to
seriously consider the consequences of her decisions.202 By transforming the willexecution process into a ceremony, the law cautions the donor that she is making
important decisions.203 Will-execution formalities therefore facilitate the exercise of
freedom of disposition by attempting to at least partially alleviate the moral hazard
concerns that arise because the donor will be dead at the time her decisions take
effect.
The formalities with which the donee must comply to disclaim a transfer serve
similar functions as the formalities with which the donor must comply to execute a
legally effective will.204 For instance, the formalities provide evidence of the donee’s
196

See supra Part I.B.2.
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13.
198
See Sherman, supra note 110, at 1294.
199
See supra Part II.B.3.
200
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13.
201
See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941)
(explaining that the requirement of writing “induc[es] [a] circumspect frame of mind”); John
H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1975)
(“The requirement[] of writing . . . [is a] primary cautionary formalit[y]. Writing is somewhat
less casual than plain chatter. As we say in a common figure of speech, ‘talk is cheap.’”).
202
See Glover, supra note 187, at 622 (“[B]y introducing outsiders into the
testamentary experience, the formality of attestation sets the execution of a will apart from
ordinary transactions.”); John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of
Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
3 (1987) (“Signature . . . caution[s] the testator about the seriousness and finality of his act.”).
203
See C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform:
An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the
Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 261–62 (1991) (“A secondary aspect
of formality is its tendency to induce deliberation and reflection on the part of the testator.
Formality thus prevents enforcement of casual statements and unpremeditated action . . . .”).
204
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 151 (“As a matter of public policy, what degree of
formality should the law require for a binding disclaimer? Our starting point for such an
197
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intent to disclaim.205 When the donee expresses her intent to reject a transfer from
the donor’s estate in writing and perhaps also complies with additional formalities,206
the court has assurance that she actually intended to renounce the gift. More
particularly, formal requirements for effective disclaimers limit the opportunity for
fraud that would be present if the law did not prescribe a process through which the
donee can effectively disclaim a gift.207 The Supreme Court of Virginia recognized
this evidentiary function of formality in the context of both executing a will and
disclaiming a gift when it explained, “The law requires wills to be executed with
certain solemnities; and it would present a strange anomaly, if a devise, required to
be in writing and executed with such solemnities, could be defeated, and in effect
abrogated, by the testimony of a single witness proving some verbal disclaimer.”208
Thus, the formal requirements for disclaiming a transfer are intended to prevent
fraud and to provide robust evidence of the donee’s intent.
Furthermore, like the donor’s decision-making process might be distorted by
the moral hazard of testation, 209 the donee’s decision-making process might be
affected by what is known as the endowment effect.210 The endowment effect refers
to the psychological phenomenon that people tend to value property that they
possess more than equivalent property that they do not possess.211 As a result of the
analysis is the recognition that, in its substantive attributes, a disclaimer is itself a kind of
gratuitous transfer . . . . Accordingly, the principles governing formalization of a gift would
appear pertinent.”).
205
See Hirsch, supra note 170, at 361 (explaining the formalities “ease the evidentiary
task of determining whether a beneficiary intended a purported disclaimer as binding upon
him or her”).
206
See supra notes 177–83 and accompanying text.
207
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 152 (“[I]f gifts required nothing beyond a parole,
lawmakers would render their enforcement vulnerable to fraud. [This] polic[y] is equally
apropos to declarations of disclaimer.”); Hirsch, supra note 170, at 361 (“As a matter of
substantive law, courts have noted the policy against fraudulent assertions of a disclaimer to
change distributions.”).
208
Bryan v. Hyre, 40 Va. 94, 105 (Va. 1842).
209
See supra Part II.B.3.
210
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 152–53.
211
See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1227, 1228 (2003) (“The much studied ‘endowment effect’ stands for the principal that
people tend to value goods more when they own them than when they do not. Move a person
from a city house to a country house and, low and behold, he is quite likely to prefer the
country house more than he did when he resided in the city. A consequence of the endowment
effect is the ‘offer-asking gap,’ which is the empirically observed phenomenon that people
will often demand a higher price to sell a good that they possess than they would pay for the
same good if they did not possess it at present.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with
Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1150 (1986) (“Social psychologists have
demonstrated that people sometimes value things once they have them much more highly
than they value the same things when they are owned by others.”). See generally WARD
FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 209–17
(2007) (explaining that “things seem more valuable to people once they own them,” due to
the endowment effect).
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endowment effect, individuals tend to overvalue property that they own and to
undervalue property that they do not.212 The distortions of the endowment effect are
directly applicable to the donee’s decision to either accept or to reject a transfer from
the donor’s estate.213 Because the donee does not yet own the property that she must
decide whether to disclaim, she might underestimate the utility that she would
receive from the donor’s gift and consequently might not adequately consider the
consequences of disclaiming.
One rationale for allowing the donee to reject a gift is that she can increase the
utility of the donor’s estate plan by engaging in postmortem estate planning. 214
However, this rationale is undermined if the donee does not accurately value the
donor’s gift because her decision-making process is distorted by the endowment
effect. In fact, if the donee does not make rational decisions, then freedom of
inheritance could actually decrease social welfare. As such, the law should require
the donee to comply with certain formalities to disclaim a gift to remind her that she
is making important decisions that warrant careful and thoughtful consideration.215
Much like will-execution formalities encourage the donor to make deliberate and
informed decisions regarding how to distribute property upon death,216 disclaimer
formalities encourage the donee to make deliberate and informed decision regarding
whether to accept or to reject a gift from the donor’s estate. In this way, formalities
combat both the moral hazard of testation and the endowment effect by encouraging
the donor to exercise freedom of disposition and the donee to exercise freedom of
inheritance in ways that maximizes social welfare.217
212

See Charles B. Craver, The Negotiation Process, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 271, 286
(2003) (“People who own goods that others wish to purchase tend to overvalue those items,
while individuals who are thinking of buying goods possessed by others tend to undervalue
those items.”); Debra Pogrund Stark et al., Complex Decision-Making and Cognitive Aging
Call for Enhanced Protection of Seniors Contemplating Reverse Mortgages, 46 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 299, 338 (2014) (explaining that “endowment effects” occur when “consumers
overvalue things that they already own and undervalue things that they do not”).
213
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 152–53. (“Because she has not yet taken possession, a
disclaiming beneficiary may well view the transaction not as a (painful) loss, but rather as a
(relatively painless) forgoing of a gain. In consequence, the possibility that she will disclaim
without due deliberation looms larger . . . .”); Hirsch, supra note 37, at 36 (“How might the
endowment effect affect the treatment of inherited wealth? Well, that depends. If the
beneficiary fails to conceptualize an inheritance as really being ‘her’ property, she might be
less averse to risking or dissipating it . . . This phenomenon, I suspect, may help explain the
high frequency of disclaimers of inheritances.”).
214
See supra Sections II.B.3–5.
215
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 152–53 (suggesting that the possibility that the donee’s
decision-making process might be distorted by the endowment effect “underscor[es] the
importance of formal requirements such as a writing that tend to promote reflection”);
Hirsch, supra note 170, at 361 (explaining that “courts have also observed the usefulness of
a writing to clarify to beneficiaries that a disclaimer is a legally performative act”).
216
See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.
217
Formalities do not directly cause the donor to internalize all of the costs of her
decisions, nor do they directly cause the donor to accurately assess the utility of the donor’s
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Will-execution formalities and disclaimer formalities therefore serve similar
functions. In particular, they provide evidence of the donor’s and the donee’s intent,
including evidence that wills and disclaimers are not the product of fraud, and they
caution the donor and the donee to make reasoned decisions regarding how to
distribute property upon death and regarding whether to disclaim a transfer from the
donor’s estate. But just because disclaimer formalities serve similar purposes as willexecution formalities does not mean that the law should require the same formalities
in both contexts. Indeed, because formalities limit the manner in which the donee
can exercise freedom of inheritance, policymakers should tailor the prescribed
formalities to fit the specific context of disclaimers.
With this need for tailoring in mind, should the law require the donee to comply
with the same formalities that the donor must satisfy in order to execute a valid will,
namely a signed and witnessed writing, as some states currently mandate?218 Or
should the law follow the lead of other states and require fewer formalities, such as
a signed writing or perhaps merely a written document without the need of a
signature? 219 To decide which formalities are appropriate, policymakers must
evaluate both the difficulty that courts have in deciphering the donee’s intent to
disclaim, including the risk of fraud, and the possibility that the donee will disclaim
a gift without adequately considering the costs and benefits of her decisions. If the
evidentiary difficulties and risk of haphazard decision-making are high, then
formality levels should be high, but if these concerns are low, then formality levels
should also be low.
The evidentiary difficulties associated with deciphering the donee’s intent is
the first issue that policymakers should consider when selecting the formalities that
the donee must satisfy to effectively disclaim a gift. When compared with the
difficulties of identifying the donor’s intent, the court’s task of deciding whether the
donee intended to disclaim a transfer from the donor’s estate appears relatively easy.
The court’s task of deciding whether a donor intended a will to be legally effective
presents problems because a will only becomes legally effective after the donor
dies,220 and as such the donor need not directly communicate her intent to anyone
during her life.221 As a result, questions sometimes arise regarding whether the donor
intended a document found after her death to be a legally effective expression of her
estate plan.222 The signature and witnessing requirements reduce these evidentiary
gift. However, formalities at least encourage the donor and the donee to seriously consider
their decisions, which might indirectly correct the moral hazard and endowment effect
distortions that affect their decision-making processes.
218
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
219
See supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text.
220
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 147.
221
See Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600, 608 (Ill. 1955) (“[A] will is ordinarily an
expression of the secret wish of the testator”); Karen J. Sneddon, Speaking for the Dead:
Voice in Last Wills and Testaments, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 683, 740 (2011) (“Due to the
ambulatory nature of wills, many provisions and terms remain secret until the testator’s
death.”).
222
See supra notes 184–189 and accompanying text.
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difficulties because few people would satisfy these requirements without intending
the will to be legally effective.223 By contrast, fewer evidentiary difficulties arise in
the context of disclaimers because the donee must affirmatively express her intent
to disclaim to either the probate court or the donor’s personal representative.224 This
affirmative act of communication provides reliable evidence that the donee
unequivocally intended to disclaim the gift from the donor, 225 and consequently
fewer formalities are needed to provide evidence that the donee intended to disclaim
a transfer from the donor’s estate.
Additionally, the risk of fraudulent disclaimers is likely less than the risk of
fraudulent wills. Because a will can distribute property to anyone, the population of
potential perpetrators of fraud in the context of wills is large.226 Indeed, the impact
of a fraudulent will on the distribution of the donor’s estate could be significant. By
contrast, the population of potential perpetrators of fraud in the context of
disclaimers is relatively small because a disclaimer has only a minor effect on the
distribution of the donor’s property. When the donee disclaims a gift, an alternate
donee takes the property instead of the primary donee.227 The identity of the alternate
donee is set by decisions that the donor made in her estate plan,228 and consequently
a disclaimer has no effect on the identity of the alternate donee. Instead, a disclaimer
simply substitutes one donee that the donor selected for another donee that the donor
selected. Because fewer people have a motive to perpetrate fraud in the context of
disclaimers than in the context of wills,229 fewer formalities are needed to protect the
donee from wrongdoing.
223

See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 153.
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 149 n.187.
225
This rationale is similar to the rationale that lifetime gifts of personal property must
be delivered to the donee. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2003) (“Delivery . . . constitutes an
event that supplies objective evidence [of a gift]”); Hirsch, Formalizing Transfers, supra
note 147, at 818 (“[D]elivery clarifies that the donor intended an enforceable gift and avoids
misunderstanding by the donee.”); Chad A. McGowan, Special Delivery: Does the Postman
Have to Ring at All—The Current State of the Delivery Requirement for Valid Gifts, 31 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 357, 367 (1996) (“Delivery serves as evidence supporting the donee’s
claim of gift. In other words, possession by an alleged donee would greatly increase the
likelihood that the donee was telling the truth. If the donee actually possessed the thing given,
the donor could be said to have actually intended to part with it.”).
226
See Glover, Probate-Error Costs, supra note 171, at 641–42 (“[T]he wrongdoer
specifies the gifts that are made through the terms of the fraudulent will, and therefore the
wrongdoer has wide latitude to describe an estate plan that significantly departs from the
decedent’s intended estate plan.”).
227
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 140.
228
See Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 59, at 163; see also supra note 72–75 and
accompanying text.
229
The person with the greatest motivation to produce a fraudulent disclaimer is the
alternate donee, who stands to directly benefit. However, others might also have a motive to
produce a fraudulent disclaimer, including anyone who would prefer the alternate donee to
benefit rather than the primary donee. By contrast, anyone could have a motive to produce a
224
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In addition to the evidentiary difficulties of identifying the donee’s intent,
policymakers should also consider the risk that the donee will exercise her right to
disclaim without appropriate consideration. One purpose of will formalities is to
remind the donor that she is making important decisions that warrant careful
reflection. 230 Disclaimer formalities serve the same purpose; 231 however, fewer
formalities are necessary in the context of disclaimers because, again, the donee
must directly communicate her intent to either the probate court or the donor’s
personal representative. 232 In essence, the requirement that the donee deliver a
disclaimer serves as a formality that cautions her to make careful decisions. This
cautioning effect of delivery is recognized in the context of lifetime gifts. To make
a gift of personal property during life, the donor need not produce a signed and
witnessed writing. 233 Instead, the donor must deliver either the property or
something that symbolizes the property to the donee. 234 The donor’s act of
relinquishing the property serves as a formality that cautions her to make thoughtful
decisions.235 Similarly, the requirement that the donee deliver a disclaimer, which
symbolizes the property that she is renouncing, provides the donee an opportunity
to step back and reconsider her decision to disclaim. And because the donee must
deliver a disclaimer to the probate court or to the donor’s personal representative,
fraudulent will because anyone can directly benefit. An additional wrinkle regarding
fraudulent disclaimers is that, under some circumstances, the donee must disclaim a gift
within a specific timeframe. See infra Section III.B. In these instances, the primary donee
might have a motive to produce a fraudulent disclaimer in order to satisfy the timeliness
requirement, and consequently disclaimer formalities might be needed to protect against this
type of fraud. See Hirsch, Code Breakers, supra note 170, at 361 (“By requiring a written
record, the authors of federal tax law probably sought to preclude fraudulent claims of timely
disclaimers.”).
230
See supra notes 201–203 and accompanying text.
231
See Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 59, at 152–53; see also supra notes 214–217 and
accompanying text.
232
See Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 59, at 149 n.187.
233
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 (AM.
LAW. INST. 2003). Gifts of real property, however, do require certain formalities. See id. §
6.3.
234
See Hirsch, supra note 147, at 815 (“Under the traditional view, delivery must be
‘manual,’ a literal movement of the gift corpus into the hands of the donee . . . unless manual
delivery is impossible or impracticable. In that event, the donor can substitute an alternative
form of delivery—either constructive delivery of something (such as a key) that opens up
access to the gift, or delivery of a writing describing the gift. The modern view,
acknowledged nowadays by many courts, permits these alternative forms of delivery
irrespective of the ease of manual delivery.”).
235
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
6.2 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Delivery impresses on the donor that the donor is parting
with dominion and control . . . .”); McGowan, supra note 225, at 367 (explaining that one
“purpose of delivery is to caution the donor of the magnitude and consequences of the
donor’s act”); Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of
Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 348 (1926)
(“[D]elivery makes vivid and concrete to the donor the significance of the act he doing.”).
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but does not need to communicate her intent to anyone during life, fewer formalities
are necessary to serve the cautionary function when a donee disclaims a gift than
when a donor executes a will.
Thus, disclaimers seem to present fewer evidentiary difficulties and less risk of
haphazard decisions than wills. Consequently, the law should require fewer
formalities for the validity of a disclaimer than for the validity of a will. Specifically,
because they impede the exercise of freedom of inheritance and are not needed to
serve an evidentiary or cautionary function, the attestation and notarization
requirements that some states impose upon disclaimers should be eliminated.236 By
contrast, the writing and signature formalities are less burdensome and therefore do
not substantially impede the donee’s exercise of freedom of inheritance. At the same
time, these requirements also fulfill the diminished evidentiary and cautionary needs
within the context of disclaimers.237 Indeed, a signed writing, or at least a simple
writing, is needed so that the donee can deliver something to the probate court or to
the donor’s personal representative that symbolizes her relinquishment of the
disclaimed property.238 In sum, by weighing the evidentiary and cautionary concerns
of disclaimers along with the potential impediment to a disclaimer’s validity that
formalities represent, policymakers can facilitate the donee’s exercise of freedom of
inheritance in a way that maximizes social welfare.
B. Timeliness
Another way policymakers facilitate freedom of inheritance is by delineating a
timeframe during which the donee must either accept or reject a gift. Traditionally,
most disclaimer statutes have imposed a fixed deadline by which the donee must
exercise her right to disclaim.239 If the donee does not disclaim within the prescribed
236

Similar arguments have been made in the context of will execution reform. See
James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 573
(1990) (“By continuing to insist on attestation, our current legal system does not protect
testators from others. Instead, it protects many testators from effectuating their own estate
plans.”). The merit of eliminating witnessing requirements is debatable. See Glover, ProbateError Risk, supra note 173, at 373–77. However, the argument seems to be stronger in the
context of disclaimers.
237
See Langbein, supra note 201, at 498 (“Writing and signature are the minimum
requirements which assure finality, accuracy and authenticity of purported testamentary
expressions.”).
238
A related issue that is beyond the scope of this Article is whether a “writing” should
be limited to a physical document or whether electronic mediums should satisfy the writing
requirement for valid disclaimers. See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT § 5 cmt.
(NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) (acknowledging that “a
disclaimer may be prepared in forms other than typewritten pages with a signature in pen”
and authorizing electronic disclaimers); Hirsch, supra note 170, at 362 (explaining that “five
jurisdictions have modified this provision of UDPIA to permit only disclaimers that a
beneficiary executes in a signed writing” and suggesting that “[t]his modification appears
justified as a matter of public policy, although the issue is debatable”).
239
See Hirsch, supra note 170, at 335–36.
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time, she must accept the gift.240 A timeliness requirement for an effective disclaimer
would seem to undermine the social welfare maximization goal of the law because
it serves as yet another hurdle that the donee must navigate in order to effectively
disclaim a gift. Some donees who want to reject a transfer from the donor’s estate
will fail to do so within the prescribed timeframe, and in these instances the social
welfare benefits of a disclaimer will not be realized.241
Furthermore, one rationale for granting the donee freedom of inheritance is that
the donor may have had imperfect information at the time she crafted her estate plan.
Without the ability to fully understand the future needs of her family, the donor
likely cannot make decisions regarding the disposition of her property that perfectly
account for changing circumstances between the time she crafts her estate plan and
the time that she dies. 242 As such, the donor might make decisions that fail to
maximize the social welfare generated by the distribution of her estate. However,
freedom of inheritance allows the donee to assess the utility of the donor’s estate
plan at the time of the donor’s death, and consequently the donee has better
information regarding familial needs.243 If, based on the circumstances that exist at
the time of the donor’s death, the alternate donee would benefit more from the
donor’s property than the primary donee, the primary donee can increase the utility
of the donor’s estate plan by exercising her right to disclaim. 244 A disclaimer
deadline would therefore seem to limit a donee’s ability to address the problems
created by the donor’s exercise of freedom of disposition with imperfect
information. After all, the longer the donee has to decide whether to accept or to
reject the transfer from the donee, the greater the opportunity the donee has to
acquire better information.
Because a deadline represents a potential stumbling block for the effectiveness
of a disclaimer and also limits the donee’s ability to acquire information regarding
the utility of accepting or rejecting a gift, a timeliness requirement could diminish
the social welfare benefits of freedom of inheritance. Consequently, policymakers
should impose a deadline only in specific scenarios in which a timeliness
requirement serves an important purpose. For instance, federal tax law imposes a
nine-month timeliness requirement for effective disclaimers that starts at the donor’s
death.245 If the donee does not disclaim within this timeframe, a disclaimer will not
240

See id.
See id. at 336 (“[A] deadline for disclaiming discriminates against more poorly
counseled beneficiaries, who stand at greater risk of overstepping the time limit as a result
of ignorance or possibly indecision.”). In this regard, a timeliness requirement resembles the
formalities with which the donee must comply to effectively disclaim a gift from the donor.
See supra notes 182–183 and accompanying text. Both present the possibility that a
disclaimer will be ineffective despite that the donee truly intended to disclaim a gift.
242
See supra Part II.B.4.
243
See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1892–93; Weisbord, supra note 124, at 1936.
244
See supra notes 125–143 and accompanying text.
245
See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(A) (West 2017). For donees who are under the age of
twenty-one, the deadline is nine months after reaching the age of twenty-one. See id. §
2518(b)(2)(B).
241
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be effective for federal tax purposes.246 As explained above, a prolonged disclaimer
period in this context might have social welfare benefits;247 however, it also has the
potential cost of disrupting the federal tax system.248
To illustrate, an open-ended disclaimer period could hinder timely and accurate
tax reporting. If the donor’s executor were allowed to delay filing the donor’s estate
tax return indefinitely while a donee decides whether to accept or to reject a gift,
administration of the federal wealth transfer tax system would become slow and
inefficient. Likewise, allowing the donee to disclaim a gift after the executor files
the donor’s estate tax return would inject confusion and inconsistency within the tax
system.249 As Professor Grayson McCouch explains,
[R]equiring that a disclaimer generally be made promptly . . . facilitates
orderly administration of federal transfer taxes . . . . [Conversely,]
[p]ermitting a transferee to make a tax-free disclaimer after the expiration
of the limitation period for assessing tax on the original transfer would
create uncertainty and severely disrupt transfer tax administration.250
Thus, although a disclaimer deadline generally would seem to undermine the social
welfare goal of the law, such a deadline for tax purposes may actually increase social
welfare by fostering an efficient tax system.251
Although a disclaimer time limit might serve an important purpose for tax
purposes, such a deadline likely does not increase social welfare outside the realm
of tax-motivated disclaimers. Unlike its effect on the federal wealth transfer tax
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For a discussion of the effect of disclaimers within the context of federal wealth
transfer taxes, see supra notes 134–139 and accompanying text.
247
See supra notes 241–244 and accompanying text.
248
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 125; Hirsch, supra note 170, at 336.
249

For example, the transfer may qualify for a marital deduction if the interest
passes to the transferor’s spouse, or it may be subject to special gift tax valuation
rules if the transferee is a ‘member of the transferor’s family,’ or it may avoid
triggering a generation-skipping transfer tax if the transferee is a ‘non-skip
person.’ In each case, however, a disclaimer by the original transferee might shift
the interest to another person and produce dramatically different tax results.
Grayson M.P. McCouch, Timely Disclaimers and Taxable Transfers, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1043, 1054–55 (1993).
250
Id.; see Hirsch, supra note 170, at 336 (explaining that a disclaimer deadline
“facilitates timely tax reporting”).
251
Within the context of the federal tax system, a fixed disclaimer deadline may also
have other benefits. See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 125 (“Within the tax sphere, a short
deadline on disclaimers serves the purpose of maintaining the fiscal integrity of the estate
tax, by ensuring the beneficiary’s opportunity to engage in postmortem tax planning does
not exceed those that the benefactor could have exploited at the time of death.”).
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system,252 an unlimited disclaimer period would not significantly disrupt the probate
process. Indeed, a prolonged delay in the donee’s decision either to accept or to
reject a gift would likely only inconvenience the alternate donee who must endure
the uncertainty regarding whether she will receive disclaimed property. 253 Other
donees within the donor’s estate plan will not be affected, as they can accept property
as soon as the executor is ready to commence the distribution of the donor’s estate.254
Thus, although a time limit on disclaimers may serve important purposes for
tax purposes,255 policymakers should eliminate any general deadline for the donee
to decide whether to accept or to reject a transfer from the donor’s estate because
doing so would likely increase social welfare. 256 An unlimited timeframe for
disclaimers would make the disclaimer process simpler and increase the likelihood
that a donee who wants to disclaim will do so effectively. 257 In turn, the social
welfare benefits of disclaimers will more likely be realized. Furthermore, without
the need to disclaim within a prescribed period, the donee has a greater opportunity
to collect information regarding the utility that would be produced by either
accepting or rejecting the gift. By exercising freedom of inheritance with better
information, the donee can increase the welfare generated by the disposition of the
donor’s estate. 258 Thus, the elimination of a general disclaimer deadline would
facilitate the donee’s exercise of freedom of inheritance and would not significantly
disrupt the probate process.
252

See supra notes 245–251 and accompanying text.
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 126 n.89 (“One might argue that alternative
beneficiaries . . . bear part of the cost of the delay, although anything they gain from a
disclaimer is, from their perspective, a windfall.”). Of course, a delay in the donee’s decision
to accept or to reject a gift could also inconvenience the donee herself. See id. at 126 (“[T]he
only persons inconvenienced by the delay are the undecided beneficiaries themselves. And
when the cost of further delay outweighs the benefit of indecision, then presumably they will
make their election.”). A prolonged disclaimer period could also raise other concerns. See
Hirsch, supra note 170, at 337 (“The key issue is whether a protracted right of disclaimer
might permit beneficiaries to deceive a potential lender into extending credit on the strength
of an inheritance that they then decline to accept. This danger appears illusory. So long as
they have not taken possession of an inheritance, beneficiaries are not ostensible owners.”).
254
See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 126 (“If beneficiaries procrastinate over the question
of whether or not to accept an inheritance, the personal representative will have to hold the
estate open until they come to a decision. Yet, on reflection, the costs thereby occasioned
appear inconsequential, for the personal representative can proceed with dispatch to
distribute the balance of the state . . . .”).
255
See supra notes 246–251 and accompanying text.
256
The UDPIA has suggested such a reform. See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP.
INTERESTS ACT prefatory note (1999) (“It does not . . . include a specific time limit on the
making of any disclaimer. Because a disclaimer is a refusal to accept, the only bar to a
disclaimer should be acceptance of the offer.”).
257
See Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 59, at 124 (explaining that “the benefit of
UDPIA’s innovation is one of simplification: By eliminating the time limit . . . [the UDPIA]
increase[s] the probability that the beneficiary will disclaim effectively.”).
258
See supra Part II.B.4.
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C. Restrictions
Perhaps the most straightforward way that the law facilitates both the donor’s
freedom of disposition and the donee’s freedom of inheritance is by limiting the
restrictions it places on such freedoms. For instance, the law denies courts the
general ability to second-guess the merits of the donor’s and the donee’s decisions.
As the Restatement explains, “American law does not grant courts any general
authority to question the wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s
decisions about how to allocate his or her property.” 259 Likewise, the UDPIA
suggests that courts should not question the donee’s decisions when it explains that
the donee’s ability to disclaim a gift is “comprehensive” and that the law is
“[generally] designed to allow every sort of disclaimer.”260 Thus, a general principle
of the modern law of succession is that the court should honor the donor’s and the
donee’s respective freedoms by carrying out their intent.
Although the law typically defers to the donor’s decisions regarding how
property should be distributed upon death, it restricts the donor’s freedom of
disposition in certain circumstances.261 As explained previously,262 the law generally
requires the donor to transfer a portion of her estate to her surviving spouse. 263
Regardless of whether the donor unequivocally expresses the intent to disinherit her
surviving spouse, the law prevents her from doing so.264 Because this forced spousal
share restricts, rather than facilitates, the donor’s freedom of disposition, its place
within the law of succession should be based upon important policy considerations.
Indeed, if freedom of disposition is justified as a mechanism for maximizing the
utility generated by the distribution of the donor’s estate, any restriction on this
freedom should be founded upon a social welfare rationale.

259

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE
RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 6–7 (2010) (explaining that under “American
law . . . freedom of testation is paramount and the courts have no power to deviate from a
person’s will”).
260
UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT prefatory note (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010); see Bender, supra note 78, at 892 (“Traditionally,
courts could not examine the motivation behind a disclaimer.”); Ellsworth, supra note 57, at
703 (“Ordinarily, the purpose for which a disclaimer is made has no bearing on its validity.”);
see also Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1872 (“Under most circumstances today, beneficiaries are
free to accept or reject an inheritance as they see fit.”); Hirsch, supra note 7, at 588 (“The
beneficiary of a gratuity may accept or reject it at his discretion.”).
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See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“American law curtails freedom of disposition only to the
extent that the donor attempts to make a disposition or achieve a purpose that is prohibited
or restricted by an overriding rule of law.”); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1138–40.
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See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
263
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 512–16; see, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE
§ 2-201 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010).
264
See Rosenbury, supra note 69, at 1245.
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In this regard, the forced spousal share can be justified as a way to limit the
negative externalities produced by the donor’s estate plan. Although the donor is in
the best position to make decisions regarding how to dispose of property after
death,265 certain aspects of estate planning suggest that the donor might not make
decisions that maximize social welfare.266 One of these considerations is that the
donor can make decisions that produce costs that she does not internalize.267 If the
donor bears the costs of her estate plan, then decisions that maximize the donor’s
individual utility likely also maximize overall social welfare because the donor can
weigh all the costs and benefits of certain decisions and make choices that generate
the greatest utility. However, if the donor’s decisions have costs that are born by
others, an estate planning decision that maximizes the donor’s individual utility
might not maximize social welfare.268 These external costs, which are known as
negative externalities, might warrant the law’s imposition of certain restrictions on
freedom of disposition in order to further its social welfare maximization goal.269
Consider again the forced spousal share. The donor generally is in the best
position to decide what portion of her estate to give to her surviving spouse and what
portion of her estate to give to others. Thus, if the donor internalizes all of the costs
of the decision to disinherit her surviving spouse, the law can rely upon the donor to
maximize the utility generated from her estate plan. However, the donor might not
internalize all of the costs produced by her decision to disinherit a surviving
spouse.270 For instance, without an inheritance from the donor, the surviving spouse
may need to seek support from social services programs, and the cost of the
surviving spouse’s care could consequently fall on society as a whole, rather than
on the donor as an individual. 271 Because the donor might not consider these
potential costs when she is crafting her estate plan, a donor’s decision to disinherit
a surviving spouse might not maximize social welfare. The law therefore imposes
the forced spousal share, in part, to ensure that the donor’s estate plan does not
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See supra Part I.B.2.
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1158 (“[T]here are several theoretical reasons why
effectuating the donor’s express wishes may diverge from what is socially optimal, including
(1) imperfect information, (2) negative externalities, and (3) intergenerational equity.”); see
also SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 70–71 (including “the cost and impracticality of making
highly refined arrangements for dead hand control,” “harmful external effects,” and “inherent
inequality in the wealth of the present generation versus that of future generations” among
the “[v]alid arguments against dead hand control of property”).
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See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1161–63 (“Externalities . . . may arise because of a
disposition of property at death.”).
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See id. at 1161 (explaining that “an owner (here, the donor) may have an incentive
to undertake activity (in this case, a gift at death) if the ‘activity’s private benefits exceed its
private costs even though, as a result of the externality, the activity is undesirable as its social
costs exceed its social benefits’”).
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See id. at 1161–63.
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See id. at 1162.
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See id.; SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 65.
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generate negative externalities, which in turn increases the likelihood the donor’s
estate planning decisions maximize social welfare.272
Just as certain restrictions of freedom of disposition might increase the utility
generated from the distribution of the donor’s estate, some restrictions of freedom
of inheritance might also maximize social welfare. Although the donee is in the best
position to decide whether to accept or reject a gift from the donor, 273 certain
circumstances suggest that she might not exercise her freedom of inheritance in a
way that maximizes social welfare. One of these situations involves Medicaid
eligibility. Medicaid is a governmental assistance program that provides health care
benefits to individuals with limited financial resources. 274 A donee’s decision
whether to accept or to reject a gift from the donor can affect the donee’s Medicaid
eligibility. For instance, a donee who is receiving Medicaid benefits might become
ineligible if she were to accept a gift from the donor. In such a situation, the donee
has a choice: she can accept the gift and lose her Medicaid eligibility or she can
reject the gift and maintain her Medicaid eligibility.275
Although the law typically defers to the donee to make such choices, the law
restricts the donee’s freedom of inheritance in this situation. While the donee can
reject a gift while receiving Medicaid benefits, the law includes the disclaimed
property within the donee’s Medicaid eligibility calculation.276 Thus, the law does
not directly limit the donee’s freedom of inheritance in this situation because the
donee can still choose whether to accept or to reject a gift; however, it indirectly
limits freedom of inheritance by eliminating some of the benefit that the donee
receives from disclaiming. The rationale underlying this restriction on freedom of
inheritance is similar to the rationale of the forced spousal share, 277 as both are
designed to address a problem of negative externalities. Just as the donor will not
bear all of the costs of her decision to disinherit her surviving spouse, the donee will
not bear the costs of her decision to maintain Medicaid eligibility by disclaiming a
gift.278 Under either scenario, the cost of support falls on society as a whole, rather
272

See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1162.
See supra Part II.B.4.
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See John A. Miller, Medicaid Spend Down, Estate Recovery and Divorce: Doctrine,
Planning and Policy, 23 ELDER L.J. 41, 46–47 (2015).
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See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1896 (“Medicaid provides medical benefits to citizens
in financial distress. An inheritance relieves that distress and can cause a citizen to become
ineligible. In turn, a beneficiary might disclaim an inheritance in an effort to maintain his or
her eligibility.”).
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See id. at 1897 (“With few exceptions, state courts testing the issue . . . have judged
disclaimers ineffective to render beneficiaries eligible for Medicaid. Wherever courts have
allowed them, state legislators have reacted promptly to overturn the decisions. No federal
court has yet spoken to the matter.”); see, e.g., Troy v. Hart, 697 A.2d 113, 118 (Md. 1997).
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See supra notes 270–272 and accompanying text.
278
See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 602 (“[D]isclaimers by the devisee would have resulted
in her continued dependence upon Medicaid payments, whereas ‘the purpose of [Medicaid
is] to aid only the economically disadvantaged persons: the economic viability of the
Medicaid program itself can be maintained only if the eligibility requirements are diligently
observed.’” (quoting In re Scrivani, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (citations
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than on the individual decision-maker. As a result, the decision-maker, whether the
donor or the donee, might not make decisions that maximize social welfare, and the
law therefore restricts both freedom of disposition and freedom of inheritance in
ways that are designed to limit the negative externalities that are produced by the
exercise of these freedoms.
In sum, because freedom of inheritance plays an important role in furthering
the law’s overarching objective of maximizing social welfare,279 the law should be
designed to facilitate the donee’s exercise of this freedom. Specifically, when both
prescribing the form that a valid disclaimer must take and the time period during
which the donee must express her intent to disclaim, policymakers should balance
the benefits of disclaimer formalities and deadlines with the social welfare benefits
of freedom of inheritance. 280 Likewise, policymakers should consider the law’s
social welfare maximization goal when crafting restrictions on freedom of
inheritance. Because restrictions on freedom of inheritance hinder the facilitative
function of the law, they should be analyzed from a social welfare perspective to
ensure that such restrictions aim to increase the utility created by the donor’s estate
plan.281
CONCLUSION
The donor is not the sole decision-maker regarding the disposition of her
property upon death. To be sure, the donor enjoys broad freedom to craft an estate
plan to her liking.282 But when the donor decides to make a gift to a particular donee,
the donee must also make a decision. Specifically, she must decide either to accept
the gift from the donor or to reject it.283 The donee’s discretion to accept or to reject
a transfer from the donor’s estate can be labeled “freedom of inheritance”284 and
stands alongside the donor’s freedom of disposition as important elements of the
modern law of succession.

omitted)); Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1898 (“In crafting the law, the rationale for suppression
of Medicaid planning is clear. The program exists to benefit the ‘truly needy,’ not those who
‘created their own need,’ as one court has put it. If allowed to determine Medicaid eligibility,
disclaimers would impose an ‘unnecessar[y] . . . burden on taxpayers.’” (quoting Molloy v.
Bane, 631 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (App. Div. 1995); Tannler v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc.
Sers., 564 N.W.2d 735, 741 (Wis. 1997) (citations omitted)).
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The donee can exercise freedom of inheritance in a number of ways. For
instance, when a donee accepts a transfer from the donor’s estate, she exercises
freedom of inheritance. 285 Likewise, when a surviving spouse elects to take the
forced spousal share, she exercises this freedom. 286 Conversely, when a donee
declines to take a share of the donor’s estate, either by disclaiming her interest in the
donor’s property or by opting not to take the forced spousal share, she also exercises
freedom of inheritance.287
Although legal scholars have explained that the donor’s freedom of disposition
plays an important role in maximizing social welfare,288 little attention has been paid
to the role that the donee’s freedom of inheritance plays in maximizing the utility
generated from the donor’s estate. The donor is generally in the best position to
evaluate the needs of her friends and family,289 and consequently the law typically
defers to her to make decisions that place property in the hands of donees who will
benefit the most. However, there is no guarantee that the donor will accurately assess
the utility of her estate plan or that she will actually make the best decisions.
The donee’s freedom of inheritance acts as a check on the donor’s freedom of
disposition that increases the likelihood that the distribution of the donor’s estate
will maximize social welfare. For instance, by reviewing the donor’s decision to
give her a gift at the time the donor dies rather than at the time the donor crafts her
estate plan, the donee likely has better information regarding the utility of the
transfer.290 With this better information regarding the circumstances at the time the
donor’s property is distributed, the donee can increase the utility of the donor’s estate
plan by rejecting the gift if an alternate donee would derive greater benefit from the
property. Freedom of inheritance therefore maximizes social welfare by alleviating
the problem of imperfect information that exists when the donor makes her estate
planning decisions, and indeed, the donee’s ability to decide for herself whether to
accept or to reject a gift from the donor can increase the social welfare benefits of
the donor’s estate plan in numerous other ways.291
Because freedom of inheritance plays an important role in maximizing social
welfare, the law should facilitate the donee’s exercise of this freedom. When crafting
the requirements for valid disclaimers, policymakers should balance the policy
objectives of these requirements, such as the formalities with which the donee must
comply and the timeframe during which the donee must exercise her right to
disclaim, with the social welfare benefits of broad freedom of inheritance. 292
Similarly, policymakers should analyze the explicit restrictions that they place on
the donee’s freedom of inheritance from a social welfare perspective to ensure that
a limitation on the donee’s discretion to accept or to reject a gift increases the utility
285
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generated from the transfer of the donor’s estate.293 In sum, like the donor’s freedom
of disposition, the donor’s freedom of inheritance plays an important role in pursuing
the law’s social welfare maximization goal, and policymakers should be aware of
this role when crafting the law of succession.

293

See supra Part III.C.

